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ABSTRACT 
An examination of the issues and implications posed by 
present coastal hazard zone management approaches was made. 
It was found that the recent shift in emphasis from relying 
solely on engineering measures to use of planning and 
legisl controls raised a number of important matters. 
These included the range of management responses considered 
by decision-makers, the types of techniques u to def 
hazard zones, the implementation and administration of 
hazard zones, and the implications of hazards responses for 
affected residents. 
The common theme that emerged was that the current 
management approaches do not represent the full range of 
potential choices that decision-makers could consider. It 
is suggested that consideration of a wider range of 
approaches, based on insurance, would not only increase the 
options available to decision -makers, but would also offer 
an opportunity to provide management for both existing and 
future hazard sites. This suggestion also appears to be 
complementary to other adopted responses. 
A number of alternatives are developed and the implications 
for coastal hazards policy discussed. It is concluded that 
insurance provides a useful contribution towards developing 
a comprehensive approach to coastal hazard zone management. 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
What region of the earth is not 
full of our calamities? 
Virgil 
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New Zealand has a long and varied coastline of approximately 
10,000 km, with the majority of the population located in 
urban areas around the coast. To many, the coast represents 
not only a workplace or a recreational asset but also an 
opportunity to live, whether permanently or seasonally, in 
an idyl c environment. 
Coastal development accelerated in the sixt sand 
early to mid seventies as the country's standard of living 
and mobi ty increased (Morton et al., 1973). However, prior 
to this the demand for coastal developments had already been 
established, particularly following the end of the Second 
World War. The 'boom' period of the sixties and early 
seventies reinforced that demand but today it has lessened 
slightly as a consequence of the prevailing economic 
conditions, and the implementation and administration of 
more stringent land use controls. 
In New Zealand, 
developments have 
as elsewhere in the world, many coastal 
been built within areas where the 
shoreline is actively eroding. Other developments have been 
built in areas where the coast has a stable long term 
position but exhibits periodic fluctuations around that 
stable position. In s second case a long term erosion 
risk does not strictly exist, since there is no net retreat 
of the coast (Kirk, 1979(b)). For both situations, however, 
developments located within these active zones may become 
threatened when the beach is in a retreat stage and damage 
to assets may occur (Kirk, 1979(b)). 
It is this interaction between the natural events system (in 
this instance, those factors influencing coastal processes) 
and the human use system (coastal developments and land use) 
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such that the latter is threatened or damaged which 
characterizes a natural hazard; there is no hazard where 
there is no human occupation or use. 
1.1 THE NATURE OF COASTAL EROSION 
Any beach can be thought of as a three-dimensional body of 
unconsolidated sediments, resting on some basement, and 
through which a constant stream of material is moving (Kirk, 
1979(b)). This definition concentrates attention on the 
dynamic nature of beaches and suggests a distinction between 
the activities promoting supply, transfer and loss of 
materials; and the form and position of the shoreline, which 
reflects the state of balance or imbalance among the various 
material transfers occurring (Kirk, 1979(b)). The 
consideration of the flows and transfers of materials 
between and within beach systems lies behind the classic 
notion of a sediment budget. Thus if a beach gains more 
material than it loses it will build up and the shoreline 
will advance seawards. This is termed accretion. On the 
other hand if the beach loses more material than it gains 
the sediment budget will be in deficit and erosion will 
result. 
Coastal erosion may therefore have a va ety of complex 
causes, influenced by both natural and man-induced factors, 
arising either in the factors which supply or remove beach 
materials, or in some combination of both (Kirk, 1979(b)). 
Retreat of the shoreline, however, always represents a 
deficiency of material in the sediment budget. 
1.2 STUDY OBJECTIVE 
Coastal erosion may pose a hazard to two types of coastal 
development. First, those subdivisions and developments 
already existing which are presently or potentially 
threatened, and second those sites where future settlement 
or development is anticipated. 
3 
Considering those existing developments that are threatened 
by an erosion hazard, it was estimated in 1977 that there 
were approximately 90 identified hazard s s on the New 
Zealand coast (Kirk, 1979(b)). That number has probably 
increased in the intervening period as more sites with 
established developments or use have become threatened or 
damaged by natural or man-induced erosion. This has 
resulted in an increasing number of assets, both public and 
private, being placed at sk causing concern to affected 
residents, local and central government. 
The traditional response to a coastal erosion hazard has 
been that of constructing protective works. Although this 
response is frequently appropriate to the situation, there 
are many instances where such an approach has been 
expensive, ineffective, and caused unanticipated side 
effects. Recently there has been a shift in emphasis from 
sole reliance on a 'technological fix' to one of relying on 
land-use management practices, and particularly planning 
controls. Again, however, similar problems have arisen with 
this response. 
These types of singular management approaches do not appear 
to provide positive long-term assistance or assurance to 
coastal communities located on existing hazard sites should 
a severe event occur. Considering the number of sites 
threatened by a coastal erosion hazard, and the value of 
assets at risk this poses a significant management issue. 
Opportunities for future development on potentially 
hazardous tes have become restricted with the advocacy of 
anticipatory planning measures such as hazard zone 
delineation techniques, and the enactment and implementation 
of relevant legislation. Both of these measures aim to 
ensure that future developments are sited at a respectable 
distance back from the beach. 
The use of these planning measures poses particular 
problems, however. Principally these concern the implic-
ations associated with the implementation and administration 
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of each approach, and the implications for developments 
'prudently sited' in relation to a defined hazard zone 
and/or the relevant legislation but which may at some future 
date become threatened by a coastal erosion hazard. 
This is not to imply that such ineation techniques or 
legislation are not eminently useful. It is suggested, 
though, that their use raises important management questions 
that require consideration by coastal resource managers. 
Thus, it is clear that the current hazards management 
responses pose a number of issues and implications for both 
existing and potential coastal hazard sites. The objective 
of this study, therefore, is to address those issues by 
reference to a two-fold approach. First, an examination of 
the issues, conflicts and implications posed hy the present 
coastal hazards manage~ent appro~es for existing and 
future developments is mads r and second, alternative 
management approaches that assist in resolving the issues 
and conflicts raised by the current management responses are 
developed. 
In this way it is possible to propose management approaches 
that encompass both existing and potential hazard sites, as 
well as providing opportunity for mUltiple adjustments to a 
hazard. This proposition would seem to offer the potential 
for a more comprehensive approach to coastal hazard zone 
management. 
1.3 STUDY OUTLINE AND METHODOLOGY 
The present study addresses the above objective in the 
following manner. 
CHAPTER TWO introduces the relevant literature on natural 
hazards research. The key areas of research are identified 
and discussed to provide a frame of reference within which 
the study can be defined and to provide a lead-in to issues 
which are related to, yet separate from, the natural hazards 
paradigm. 
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To examine some of the issues, conflicts and implications 
raised by current hazard zone management approaches, a case-
study was made of Wainui Beach, Gisborne. This involved 
interviewing a wide range of local interest groups including 
local authority officials, affected residents and government 
department officers. The study highlighted many the 
inadequacies of the present emphasis on planning controls 
and use of relevant legislation as management strategies. 
CHAPTER THREE presents the findings of the case-study, and 
it is suggested that the issues sed there have relevance 
to many communities on the New Zealand coast faced with a 
coastal erosion hazard. The development of approaches that 
address those issues is, therefore, both timely and 
relevant. 
Before it is possible to do this, however, it is useful to 
consider the legal and institutional aspects associated with 
coastal hazard zone management. This is outlined in CHAPTER 
FOUR by reference to the relevant statutes and planning 
responsibilities, and the policies of the hazards management 
agencies. CHAPTER FIVE draws together the important issues 
of the preceding chapters and examines and discusses them in 
greater depth. Four main issues are identified, with the 
common theme being that current management approaches do not 
represent the total range of potential hazards responses. 
It becomes possible, then, to propose alternatives that 
increase the range of choices open to decision-makers, 
encompass both sting and potential hazard sites, and 
provide a complement to other hazards management approaches. 
Insurance of s one such option. 
CHAPTER SIX serves to introduce the role of insurance as an 
alternative management response. This is done by outlining 
the contribution insurance could make to public policy on 
natural hazards generally, and then discussing its 
app cability to coastal hazards specifically. The 
proposition advanced is that insurance for loss of use of 
land caused by coastal erosion is both desirable and 
feasible, and merits further consideration as a contribution 
towards providing a more comprehensive hazards management 
approach. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN further develops the suggestion of insurance 
as an alternative hazards management approach. The 
principal participants with an interest in and/or duty for 
coastal hazard zone management are identified, and from 
these four options are presented and discussed. All the 
options are based on insurance and involve combinations of 
the identified participants. No attempt is made to 
distinguish which of the options should be adopted since 
ultimately this judgement rests with political decision-
makers. Presenting a number of options for discussion does, 
however, offer opportunity for analysis and debate, and 
serves to increase the range of hazards management 
approaches such decision-makers can consider. 
To end, the final chapter reviews the findings of the study 
and presents conclusions. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
NATURAL HAZARDS RESEARCH : A REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The coastal zone is one of transition. Dynamic forces 
associated with on-offshore and alongshore movement, as well 
as the actions of wind, waves and currents, perpetually 
modify beaches. It is when such changes to the beach 
intrude upon and threaten areas of human occupation or use 
that a natural hazard is created; there is no hazard where 
there is no human occupation or use. 
In this chapter natural research is outlined to 
provide the theoretical context upon which the study is 
based. This is useful to an appreciation of the 
various concepts that are included within the sphere of the 
natural hazards paradigm, and to provide a lead-in to 
following chapters which introduce issues related to, yet 
separate from, hazards research. 
2.2 NATURAL HAZARDS RESEARCH 
There is a fundamental distinction between extreme events in 
nature which are not necessarily hazardous to people, and 
extreme events in nature which impinge upon an associated 
human-use system. The interaction of nature and people 
creates both useful resources and hazards ( I) (Burton, 
Kates and White, 1978). 
Kates (1970:1) has defined a natural hazard as: 
I ••• an interaction of man and nature governed 
by the coexistent state of adjustment in the 
human use system and the state of nature in 
the natural events system. I 
[ Natural Events System ------. 
Resources Hazards ------------~) Response 
Human Use System -------~ 
Source: Burton, Kates and White, 1978:20 
Figure I: Resources and hazards from nature and man 
00 
and 
' ... those extreme events of nature that exceed 
the capabilities of the system to reflect, 
absorb or buffer them that lead to the harmful 
effects, ofttimes dramatic, that characterize 
our image of natural hazards. I 
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Within the natural hazards paradigm there are several major 
areas of research: general and theoretical principles 
(Burton, Kates and White, 1968, 1978; Kates, 1970; White, 
1974; White and Haas, 1975; van Dam, 1980; Hewitt, 1983); 
perception of the hazard (Kates, 1962; Burton and Kates, 
1964(a), 1964(b}; Saarinen, 1966; Ericksen, 1967; Lowenthal 
(ed.), 1967; Sinnathamby, 1981}; responses and adjustments 
to the hazard (White, 1945, 1964, 1973; Ericksen, 1967, 
1971; Burton, Kates and Snead, 1969; Golant and Burton, 
1969; Mitchell, 1974; Ayre, 1975; Mileti et al., 1975; Ward, 
1977; Waterstone, 1978; "McHugh, 1981); and decision-making, 
hazards policies and management (White, 1936, 1966; Murphy, 
1958; Sheaffer, 1960; Baker and McPhee, 1975; Cochrane, 
1975; Ericksen, 1975, 1981; Baker, 1976; Johnston, 
Kates (ed.), 1977; Kunreuther et al., 1978(b); 
-------
1979(a), 1982; Hildreth, 1980; Gibb, 1981(b), 1982; 
and Nilson, 1982; Saarinen, 1982). 
In any study of natural hazards there is neces 
1976; 
Kirk, 
Olson 
ly an 
interaction of all the above in varying degrees and extent. 
A brief discussion of each is made below. 
2.2.1 General and theoretical principles 
The 1 s and affairs of people constantly interact with the 
natural world. Elaborate technical and social mechanisms 
allow peop to seek in nature that which is useful and to 
buffer that which is harmful. In order to live with the 
harmful e of nature, complex sets of human adjustments 
are found all human-use systems. However, such 
adjustments may prove inadequate to cope with a given set of 
natural events and serious consequences may ensue (Kates, 
1970). 
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Thus, a natural hazard is characterized as being the 
interaction of the natural events and human-use systems in 
such a manner that threatens or damages the latter system. 
burden of hazard is two-fold; firstly, a continuing 
effort to make the human-use 
effects of nature, and secondly, 
ss vulnerable to the 
fic impacts on people 
and their works arising from natural events that exceed 
adjustments adopted by the system (Kates, 1970). 
The definability of hazard res more than mere 
perception, and the recognition that all types of hazard are 
subject to wide variation in definition. This reflects 
the changes in both knowledge about hazards and available 
technology (Burton and Kates, 1964(b)). 
To complicate the matter , there has been an increase 
in quasi-natural hazards. These hazards are created by 
people, but their harmful effects are transmitted via 
natural processes. An example would be man-made pollutants 
carried downstream (Burton and Kates, 1964(b)). The 
relationships of the man-nature systems mean that it is 
often difficult to categorise hazards into discrete classes, 
and there may be a linkage between any or all of: natural 
events, man-made hazards, and man-accelerated haz s. 
BUrton and Kates (1964(b)) pose as an example the problem of 
when does fog (a natural hazard) become smog? 
To close this discus it is useful to note that research 
into natural hazards may assist public policy-making by 
addressing: 
( i ) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
the 
the 
the 
extent of human occupance in hazard zones; 
full range of possible human adjustments to 
hazard; 
how man perceives and estimates the occurrence of 
hazard; 
(iv) the process of adopting damage-reducing 
adjustments; and 
(v) the optimal set of adjustments with regard to 
anticipated social consequences (Burton, Kates and 
White, 1968). 
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Researchers from a variety of disciplines are constantly 
contributing to our understanding of these questions, as 
evidenced by the studies cited ear ere 
2.2.2 Perception of the hazard 
Individuals may perceive a hazard differently according to 
many influencing factors such as age, socio-economic status, 
education, personal experience or knowledge of a hazard, 
degree of personal threat recognised, frequency of hazard 
occurrence, and awareness of the range and 
alternative hazard adjustments. 
ectiveness of 
In addition to the perceptions of individuals are those of 
scientific-technical personnel, and decision-makers such as 
local politicians, and slators. The perceptions of this 
group of 'resource managers' are important since they 
frequently influence the nature and extent of hazards 
planning and management 'programmes, which ultimately affect 
those individuals located within the hazard zone. 
Burton and Kates (1964(b» note four particularly important 
points relating to perception. Firstly, it could be 
expected that there will be a heightened perception in cases 
where the hazard is directly related to the resource use 
(for example, foredune erosion that threatens a beachfront 
home). 
Secondly, perception of natural events is related to the 
frequency of the hazard. Where the events are frequent, 
there is little difference in perception among the resource 
users. The same is true where the event is rare since the 
failure to perceive a gnificant hazard is widely shared. 
It is only when the event occurs moderately frequently that 
considerable variation among users is found. Table I 
identifies some of the common responses adopted to deal with 
the uncertainty of natural hazards. 
The third point concerns personal experience of a hazard 
event. It might be expected that personal expe ence would 
lead to increased awareness of the hazard. Although it is 
Table I: Common responses to the uncertainty of natural hazards 
Eliminate the Hazard 
Deny or denigrate 
its existence 
'We have no floods 
here, only high water' 
'It can't happen 
here' 
Deny or denigrate 
its recurrence 
'Lightning never strikes 
twice in the same 
place' 
, It.' s a freak of 
nature' 
Eliminate the Uncertainty 
Making it 
determinate and 
knowable 
'Floods come every 
five years' 
Transfer 
uncertainty to 
a higher power 
'Its in the 
hands of God' 
'The government is 
taking care of it' 
Source: Burton, Kates and White, 1968:18 
f-J 
to 
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acknowledged as a significant factor, the effect of 
experience as a determinant of perception is considerably 
blurred. 
Finally, attitudes to nature influence perception, and hence 
the manner in which hazard adjustment choices are made. 
These in turn are likely to affect management policies. 
Three divergent views of nature can be identified: 
(i) People subject to nature - accepts that nature is 
in command; 
(ii) People with nature - a complementary relationship; 
and 
(iii) People over nature - a belief that humans are 
capable of dominating nature. 
Depending on the attitudes prevalent in the society, 
adjustments to natural hazards will be made with regard to 
those attitudes and beliefs. For example, if there is a 
strong belief that people can dominate nature structural 
solutions such as stopbanks, 
favoured to deal with a hazard. 
seawalls or groynes may be 
2.2.3 Responses and adjustments to the hazard 
Response to hazards is related both to perception and to 
awareness of opportunities to make adjustments. In 
examining these adjustments it is useful to make a 
distinction between those which seek to rearrange or 
manipulate nature, and those which involve a rearrangement 
or alteration of human behaviour. The former may be 
characterized as the technological approach, the latter with 
the social or behavioural approach (Burton, Kates and White, 
1968). 
It is possible to identify four major groups of adjustments: 
(i) Adjustments that allow adaptation to losses - this 
may be either through bearing the full 
consequences of damage individually, or sharing it 
in some manner with others by, for example, 
insurance; 
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(ii) Adjustments that modify loss potent 1 - this is 
accomplished by minimising the impacts of the 
natural event and by emergency action after the 
event. The effects of the event may be reduced by 
altering man's vulnerabi ty to the hazard by 
warning systems or evacuation; 
(iii) Adjustments that mod the hazard this is 
mainly through use of engineering measures, 
offering the prospect of immediate relief; and 
(iv) Adjustments that affect the cause - human use of 
the environment may precipitate a hazard 
situation; rarely can man alter the natural events 
system so he must change the human-use system in 
the hazardous area and attempt to influence the 
activity or of human use within the area 
to offset the impacts the hazard (Burton, Kates 
and White, 1968; Sinnathamby, 1981). 
Mitchell (1974:105) pres a summary profile of 
adjustments to coastal erosion based on the above four 
groupings, and Sinnathamby (1981:12) has modified Mitchell's 
summary to make it more applicable to the New Zealand 
coastal environment (Tab II). 
According to White and Haas (1975) at least five aims figure 
in one way or another in public decisions about the choice 
of adjustments to hazards. These are noted as: 
(i) national economic ef ciency, or those adjustments 
that yi the largest marginal returns from the 
investment; 
(ii) the enhancement of human health, especially the 
preservation of human life; 
(iii) the avoidance social surprise or disruption; 
(iv) environmental protection or enhancement, although 
they concede it is often difficult to identify and 
quantify many environmental impacts; and 
(v) the equity in the distribution of costs and 
benefits in society. 
Table II: Theoretical range of adjustments to coastal erosion 
CLASS OF 
ADJUSTMENTS 
Adjustments that 
allow adaptation 
to the losses 
Adjustments that 
modify loss 
potential 
Adjustments that 
modify the 
hazard 
Adjustments that 
affect the cause 
TECHNIQUE 
ENGINEERING 
Move endangered structures 
Seawalls/bulkheads/revetments 
Groynes/breakwaters 
Beach nourishment 
Private protective structures 
ego rubble filled drums/car tyres 
Sand by-passing 
Removal of obstacles to the 
passage of river silt 
ego dams 
SOCIAL 
Loss bearing 
Insurance 
Relief and Rehabilitation 
Storm warning 
Evacuation 
Coastal zoning 
Building restrictions 
Public purchase of endangered areas 
Dune stabilisation 
Prevent beach excavation and 
harbour dredging 
Source: Mitchell (1974), as adapted by Sinnathamby, 1981:12 
I-' 
U1 
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Clearly these factors require consideration when suggestions 
for hazards policies and management strategies are made. 
The final discussion in this chapter addresses some of the 
issues policy-making and management raises. 
2.2.4 Decision-making, hazards policies and management 
Recognition of and response to natural hazards are 
intimately tied to reducing people's vulnerability to 
extreme events. However, it is only by translation of these 
facets into hazards policies and management strategies that 
they can hope to influence individual and community 
behaviour. The gap between hazards research and effective 
policy-making appears large (Olson and Nilson, 1982), 
particularly in the area of selecting equitable and 
enforceable policy instruments. 
Olson and Nilson (1982) identify four distinct policy types. 
Firstly, distributive ~olicies which are essentially non-
coercive and confer advantages on specific beneficiaries; 
the burdens or costs are borne by the general revenue system 
and are thus (usually) only dimly perceived. Good examples 
of this type of policy are the provision of emergency aid 
and low-interest rebuilding loans in the post-impact and 
recovery/reconstruction periods, and structural mitigation 
aspects of flood control (dams, stopbanks). 
A second policy type concerns constituent pOlicies. Again 
coercion is likely to be remote and unlike distributive 
policies, public power affects broader entities than 
individual units. Such changes typically enhance a 
classified segment of the population without either 
substantially or directly injuring the whole public or a 
major portion of it. The beneficiaries of the extended 
rights and powers are often accepted as the legitimate 
custodians of new responsibilities~ The classic example is 
that of professional associations. 
Regulative policies 
coercion, with the 
entail the likelihood of government 
object of coercion being the non-
complying individual entity. There is potential for 
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substantial pol ical conflict over relatively rigid 
standards which embody principles opposed by those whose 
interests and values are threatened by the proposal. This 
creates a situation in which one group's 'victory' in 
changing a statute or regulation necessarily leads to defeat 
for the opposing group. Opportunities for compromise, on 
the principles at least, are few. 
A final policy type is redistributive. These policies are 
expected to have the greatest impact on the community 
because the objects of government coercion are whole 
segments of the population. Redistributive policies demand 
that benefits be provided to one set of interests at the 
expense of another (Lowi, 1964, in Olson and Nilson, 1982). 
Associated with these different types of policy are 
different types of politics; distributive policies yield 
participatory politics in which numerous interests are 
likely to be encountered, while a constituent policy is 
expected to yield specialist politics of well-organised, 
well-informed experts. Regulative policy will be associated 
with pluralist politics. Such po tics involves 
participation by at least two contending and organized 
groups, and conflict resolution involves bargaining and 
compromise. Finally, redistributive poli es are associated 
with elitist decision-making which is private and exclusive. 
The private resolution of conflicts, followed by general 
support of the agreed-upon solution, is a political 
mechanism for minimizing the disruptiveness of controversial 
policies (Olson and Nilson, 1982). 
Hazards policy may be based on any of the above policy-
types, singularly or in combination. In formulating policy 
for coastal hazards, common elements would include: 
(i) generation and dissemin~tion of information 
coastal hazards; 
on 
(ii) thorough examination 
implications 
works; 
of any 
of 
proposed 
the environmental 
beach protection 
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(iii) regulation of future developments on undeveloped 
hazard-prone sites; 
(iv) fair treatment of land owners prohibited from 
developing their property; 
(v) examination of the costs and benefits associated 
with any particular management strategy; and 
(vi) provision for presentation, discussion and agree-
ment by affected parties on any proposed plan of 
action. 
More generally, Burton, Kates and White (1978) note that 
with much overlap, national hazards po cies seem to focus 
on: 
(i) disaster relief; 
(ii) control of natural events; 
(iii) comprehensive reduction of damage potential; and 
(iv) combined multi-hazard management. 
A disaster reI policy could take the form of a natural-
hazard insurance plan. However, the plan would have to be 
designed to avoid creating higher loss potential by 
encouraging people to take greater risk in the knowledge 
that their loss would be covered by insurance. A feasible 
suggestion is to merge the prospective insurance scheme with 
land-use planning and regulation, and set premium scales 
aimed at promoting individual or community acceptance. 
Policies based on controlling natural events rely on 
technologically-oriented adjustments. Often such reliance 
proves costly, ineffective and may lead to unanticipated 
side-effects, such as the exposure more people to rare 
but catastrophic events. One reason the ineffectual 
behaviour is the failure to take individual or 
reactions into account; control policies 
unintentionally increase the damage potential. 
community 
may thus 
Interestingly, there appears to be a move away from the sole 
reliance on technologically-oriented policies towards study 
and advocacy of social policies based on land-use 
management, zoning and insurance (see for example, Baker, 
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1975, 1976i Kunreuther et al., 1978(a}i Gibb, 1981(b}, 1982; 
Rossi et al., 1982). An examination of the implications 
raised by the current emphasis on social policies forms a 
major part this study. 
Comprehens 
developed. 
damage reduction poli es are not well 
Perhaps the most advanced is the system of flood 
insurance in the United States. The Flood Insurance Act of 
1969 made 
requirement 
modified to 
local land-use regulation in floodplains a 
for flood insurance. In 1973 the policy was 
withhold special benefits from floodplain 
who had not met the condi ons for purchasing occupants 
insurance and to make purchase a condition of participation 
in other programmes such as mortgage insurance. A recent 
comment on the effectiveness of the flood insurance 
programme points out that the success of this type of 
regulatory policy has been offset by the fact that 
regulatory systems are by nature negative and compliance is 
totally dependent on the attitude, philosophy, and will 
the governmental entity (Bragg and Coughlin, 1984). The use 
of incentives is now being considered as a further means 
reducing flood losses - for example, the use of a community 
rating system, in which a discount could be offered to all 
policyholders within a community that adopts and, more 
importantly, administers a loss reduction programme that 
addresses all of its flooding hazards (Bragg and Coughlin, 
1984). 
Combined multi-hazard management involves equa zation of 
risks, but the cost of this may be prohibitive and the 
effort futile. It does not appear that much further work 
has been carried out for this type policy. 
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2.3 SUMMARY 
This chapter has introduced the main areas of study 
conducted within the natural hazards paradigm. 
identified as: 
(i) general and theoretical principles; 
(ii) perception of the hazard; 
These were 
(iii) responses and adjustments to the hazard; and 
(iv) decision-making, hazards policies and management. 
A brief description of 
provide the theoreti ba 
the study will extend. 
each of these was presented to 
s upon which the remainder of 
Specifically it will address the 
issues, conflicts and implications posed by present coastal 
hazard management strategies, discuss approaches that 
broaden the range of adjustments decision-makers could 
consider, and examine the implications for hazards policy. 
The following chapter will address the above questions by 
presenting the findings of a case-study conducted on Wainui 
Beach, Gisborne, North Island, New Zealand. 
CHAPTER THREE 
A CASE-STUDY OF WAINUI BEACH, GISBORNE, NORTH ISLAND 
NEW ZEALAND 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
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A community and its decision-makers may adopt a variety of 
strategies in an attempt to reduce perceived impacts of a 
severe event (see Table II). In this chapter a case-study 
of a coastal community faced with an erosion hazard is 
presented. The issues and conflicts raised by the case-
study are typical of those experienced by many existing 
coastal settlements, and the implications associated with 
the adopted management s es have wide-ranging 
significance for coastal hazard zone management in general. 
The first section of the chapter outlines the case-study aim 
and method, leading on to a discussion of the nature and 
history of the hazard. A third section describes the 
adopted management responses, and the final section 
canvasses the important issues and conflicts posed by the 
current response. Points raised in this section will 
the basis of Chapter Five which discusses the issues 
posed by current hazards management responses in greater 
depth. 
3.2 CASE-STUDY AIM AND METHOD 
Current coastal hazards management strategies, such as use 
of section 641A of the Local Government Act 1974 and 
advocacy coastal hazard zone mapping (Gibb, 1982), focus 
largely on cting future inappropriate development. 
Inve on into developing management options for 
existing coastal hazard sites appears little emphasized but 
given the number of sites experiencing an erosion hazard and 
the value of assets threatened, both public and private, 
appears a cri task. 
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Wainui Beach, sborne has been used as a case-study to 
illustrate some of the questions, problems and conflicts 
posed by the adoption of current hazards management 
strategies. It is comparable with many of New Zealand's 
coastal communities since the types of problems faced and 
the responses adopted are similar to those of other 
communities, as are implications that result. The 
findings provide an indication of the signi the 
management strategies have had for the local authority and 
affected residents. This assists in clarifying the issues 
any proposed management options need to address. 
A series of informal interviews were conducted. or to 
fieldwork, however, an exami on of literature relating to 
surveys and interviewing was made (Kahn and Cannell, 1957; 
Stephan and McCarthy, 1958; Oppenheim, 1966; Anon, 1970; 
Gardner, 1976; Dillman, 1978). Relevant points concerning 
question design, delivery and recording were noted as well 
as techniques for probing to gain further information. 
Although the respondents could SCU3S any range of issues, 
five main themes were introduced during the course of each 
interview: 
(i) respondents' opinions concerning the imposition of 
a hazard zone in the dist ct planning scheme to 
regulate building permit applications; 
(ii) perceptions about the implications of the hazard 
zone; 
(iii) responsibilities and liabi ties if loss of 
property occurred; 
(iv) possible actions if loss of property occurred; and 
(v) suggestions for management alternatives to the 
hazard zone. 
Respondents were selected from three main groups. The Cook 
County Council has statutory planning responsibility for 
Wainui Beach, and interviews were conducted with the County 
Clerk, County Planner and County Engineer. A second group 
were the af residents living within the hazard zone 
(as delineated in the district planning scheme). In total 
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seventeen interviews were carried out. The final group 
consisted of the East Cape Catchment Board (who have 
responsibility for maintaining foredune protection works and 
collecting monies for these), and the district office of the 
Valuation Department. 
Information was a 0 obtained from examining files held by 
the Cook County Council, East Cape Catchment Board, 
Valuation Department (Gisborne office), local museum, and 
newspaper office. In addition the Chairman of the Wainui 
Beach Front Property Owners and Residents group provided 
much of the background information concerning the residents' 
stance and dealings with the Council. 
It is acknowledged that the survey used was not a 
statistically designed method of gathering data. However, 
it was an appropriate method to use for achieving the 
objective of this study by providing an overview the 
situation from the viewpoints of all relevant parties. This 
provided an insight into the implications of the adopted 
management strategy, raising important questions concerning 
hazards management strategies in general. 
3.3 THE NATURE AND HISTORY OF THE HAZARD 
Wainui Beach is situated about 4 km east of Gisborne City 
and is located in the Cook County. The beach is about 4.2 
km long and is situated between Tuahine Point to the south 
and Makarori Point to the north, with the Hamanatua Stream 
dividing the beach midway along its length. The southern 
half is an intensively developed beach front subdivision 
administered by the Cook County Council and the northern 
half is a pub reserve (Gibb, 1981(a» (Figure II). 
Gibb and Jones (1977) believe the Wainui Beach settlement 
became established around 1912 with a small number of beach 
holiday cottages along the seaward side of State Highway 35 
between the Wainui and Hamanatua streams. Between the two 
World Wars subdivisions were made at the southern end of 
o 
Point 
Figure II: Wainui Beach, Gisborne, North Island, New Zealand 
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the beach, and after World War II subdivision continued 
northwards to Hamanatua Stream whi the sting ones were 
further consolidated. During this time the character of the 
settlement changed from a holiday resort to a substantial 
residential area with many of the original baches being 
replaced by modern homes. Today the settlement consists 
predominantly of permanent homes. 
Between Tuahine Crescent and the Hamanatua Stream there are 
235 sections, and of these 106 front onto the beach (Gibb, 
1981(a)). Current valuations of these beach-front 
properties place the capital value (land value plus value of 
improvements) at approximately $7.7 million (Valuation 
Department, Gisborne District Office fi s, 1984). 
The coastal erosion hazard at Wainui Beach has been 
recognised for almost. 30 years. It was dramatically 
emphasized by the severe storm of July 1955 which left one 
house undermined and two to three others precariously close 
to the top of the foredune. Demands for action to protect 
the whole foreshore were, naturally, expressed by concerned 
residents. 
Further damaging storms occurred in the winters of 1964 and 
1974, lowering beach sand levels and threatening some of the 
homes closer to the edge of the foredune. 
Gibb and Jones (1977) state that since beach surveys began 
in 1973, two localised causes of foredune erosion can be 
proposed. 
The first cause is the presence of rip current channels. 
Ward (1977) has summarised their characteristics thus: when 
waves and wind drive a body of water towards the shore, the 
nearshore water level may higher than that further 
seaward. A water pressure gradient away from the shore is 
created, so that the water attempts to flow from the higher 
water level to the lower water level (that is, from 
nearshore to offshore)'. The presence of nearshore sandbars, 
and troughs in the surf-zone may temporarily obstruct this 
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flow but when the returning water pressure is sufficient it 
will find or create openings. Water passes through these 
openings to flow seawards at relatively high speeds. These 
seaward streams are termed rip currents. Because they are 
often swift flowing they can carry sediments (mainly beach 
sand) as well as scouring a channel; in this way sand is 
transported offshore into deeper water. A reduction 
beach sediment available to help consolidate the foredune is 
a consequence, so that during storms the foredune has less 
material stored to act as a 'shock absorber' to buffer 
incoming waves. 
For most of the year and over most of the length of Wainui 
Beach the presence of shoals, troughs and offshore bars 
encourages the formation of rip currents. Movement of sand 
offshore results, so that the beach is narrowed and storm 
waves can more easily attack the foredune. Positions rip 
current channels vary along the beach with different wave 
directions, so that any part of the foredune is potentially 
under threat depending on wave conditions (Gibb and Jones, 
1977). 
However, should be noted that rip currents occur on all 
sand beaches which are in a reflective state. This means 
that the beach face has first to be built up to the 
reflective stage 
occur. Thus, there 
build-up followed 
before ero on caused by rip currents can 
is a sequential behaviour of beach 
by beach-loss contributing to the longer 
term trends of erosion or accretion. No evidence suggests 
this pattern does not occur at Wainui Beach also. To assert 
that rip currents are a cause of ero on is debatable since 
they do not 'explain' anything of themselves, and it still 
remains for the true causes of erosion to be identified. 
A second possible cause of erosion postulated by 
Jones (1977) was presence of the sheet 
Gibb and 
pile spur 
groynes. Groynes are structures that extend seawards from 
the beach into the surf zone; their primary function is to 
intercept beach material moving alongshore to create a 
build-up on one side of the groyne, thus elevating beach 
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levels on the updrift side but causing lowering of beach 
levels on the downdrift side (since material movement along-
shore has been obstructed). Additionally, groynes only trap 
material moving alongshore but do not assist in trapping 
material moving on- or off-shore. 
At Wainui Beach the groynes aided foredune erosion by 
intercepting the wave residual (swash) moving up the beach, 
and directing the water to the head of the groyne. This 
scoured the face of the foredune causing serious erosion 
damage adjacent to each groyne (Gibb and Jones, 1977). It 
should be noted that an agreement has recently been reached 
between the Cook County Council and the Soil Conservation 
and Rivers Control Council (acting through the East Cape 
Catchment Board) for removal of most of the spur groynes, as 
beach conditions allow. 
Although one of the suggested causes of the foredune erosion 
has been removed, it is obvious that movement of sand along-
shore and offshore will continue to occur. It is also clear 
that adverse weather conditions will from time to t cause 
dramatic loss of foredune, on top of any long-term erosion 
trend that may exist. The nature of the hazard, therefore, 
is both a long- and short-term proposition. 
3.4 MANAGEMENT RESPONSES ADOPTED 
In Chapter Two it was suggested that hazard responses could 
be categorised under two major headings: 
(i) technological (which usually involves constructing 
some type of structure): and 
(ii) social (usually involving planning measures for 
both physical and human resources). 
Wainui Beach represents an example of both types of hazard 
responses: it has gone beyond the 'technological' response 
phase (spur and longitudinal groynes) and is now entering a 
second phase: hazard zone management ba on a 'social' 
response (use of sections 641, 641A Local Government Act 
1974 in association with coastal hazard zone mapping). 
28 
It is not proposed to discuss at length the first phase 
since it has been well documented by Ward (1977), and also 
because most of the spur groynes have been progressively 
removed. Since the issue of the groynes is relevant to the 
current conflicts, however, a brief discussion of them is 
made below. Much of the discussion is drawn from the work 
of Ward (1977). 
3.4.1 Spur groynes 
The severe storm of July 1955 led to both the Cook County 
Council and local residents making representations to the 
Government for assistance. It was not until October 1959 
that Cabinet approved a scheme designed to protect the 
length of the developed foredune south of Hamanatua Stream. 
This consisted of 28 sheet pile spur groynes perpendicular 
to the beach, as well as longitudinal rail and netting 
protection placed parallel to the foredune at the southern-
most end of the Beach. The work was carried out during 
1961-1962, with further work needed in 1966 caused partly by 
the abrading effect of the hard calcareous sandstone 
boulders eroded from the Tuahine Point headland. 
All the work was carried out by the Cook County Council with 
finance from loans, government subsidies, and Council's own 
funds. No formal provision for maintenance of the works was 
established so that many of the groynes deteriorated to the 
extent that they were a danger to beach-users, as well as 
degrading beach aesthetics. Their contribution to foredune 
protection was questionable (because of the scouring 
problem), and in 1977 it was recommended they be removed 
(Gibb and Jones, 1977). A 50% Government subsidy for their 
removal was offered and in late 1982 Cook County Council 
resolved to contribute the remainder. Most of the required 
work has now been completed. 
3.4.2 Longitudinal protection works 
Investigations carried out by the Poverty Bay (now East 
Cape) Catchment Board in the mid-seventies indicated the 
need for continuous longitudinal protection along the entire 
beach front. This was proposed as a series of basket 
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gabions (a gabion is a wire or plastic mesh basket which can 
be filled with stones larger than the mesh, and is usually 
anchored to a foundation) which were to be buried below the 
beach. In addition a space 15 m behind the gabions was 
identified as a buffer zone to provide sand to the beach 
system, by allowing the foredune slope to re-adjust during 
heavy seas. A planting programme on the foredune was 
encouraged to help stabilise it. 
The works were constructed in three stages during the period 
1975 to 1978. Costs were shared by beach-front property 
owners, who were levied according to property frontage, and 
a subsidy from Government. Provision for maintenance of the 
works was also established. Both of these procedures were 
formalised by the establishment of a Section 11 Area, for 
each stage, under the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control 
Amendment Act 1948. 
A 1981 report by the Catchment Board (East Cape Catchment 
Board, 1981(c)) noted that allowance had to be made for 
upgrading and extending longitudinal protection works when 
beach losses necessitated. Two other reports (East Cape 
Catchment Board 1981(b), 1981(d)) recommended that a unified 
rating district based on the capital value of the property 
be set up, and that a brief be given to a classifier for the 
scheme. Land was to be classified according to the degree 
of direct and indirect benefit received from the 
construction and maintenance of works - for these purposes 
properties were to be grouped into not less than two and no 
more than six classes. The classification was completed in 
early 1982 with the adoption of three classes, which has 
rationalised scheme administration. Provision for an 
unsubsidized emergency fund from collected rates was also 
confirmed. 
It is emphasized that the longitudinal works are the 
responsibility of the East Cape Catchment Board to maintain, 
and to collect rates for this purpose. Also the works are 
for the protection of the foredune and not protection of the 
beach as such (East Cape Catchment Board 1981{a)). 
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The second phase of hazards management adopted for Wainui 
Beach has been planning procedures. 
3.4.3 Planning controls 
Between August 1974 and March 1976 Cook County Council 
adopted four resolutions to be used as guidelines for the 
issuance of building permits on beach frontages: 
'22 August 1974 Cook County adopted the recommend-
ation that further building on 
sections subject to coastal erosion 
be controlled. The siting of such 
buildings to be subject to 
council's approval and that future 
subdivision of this nature be 
controlled under council's Planning 
Scheme. 
September 1974 The council clarif that policy 
by applying this policy to all work 
on beach frontage properties in the 
county requiring a building permit. 
March 1976 : -The council resolved that permits 
be issued only for houses of a 
single storey nature. The 
construction to be of such a design 
(for the building) to be capable of 
being removed from the site. Such 
removal and dismantling expenses to 
be at the owner's expense. 
March 1976 That before any building permit is 
issued for alterations, replacement 
on an existing dwelling or a new 
dwelling in the area on the seaward 
side of the road from the Okitu 
stream [Hamanatua Stream] to and 
including Tuahine Point the 
applicants be required to enter 
into a Deed indemnifying the 
council against all losses and also 
agreeing to council registering a 
Caveat against the title and 
successors in title' (Gibb and 
Jones, 1977:14). 
In addition to adopting the above guidelines, the County 
Council informally used a hazard line to assist it when 
considering building permit applications. The line was 
-delineated by the East Cape Catchment Board, and was used 
until section 641 of the Local Government Act 1974 became 
effective on 1 April 1980. This section made the refusal of 
building permits mandatory if there was actual or potential 
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risk that a site was unsuitable for building on, and if no 
provision had been or was to be made for protection of the 
land. 
To assist in implementing section 641, a commitment to 
define a coastal hazard zone at Wainui was made in 1980. 
The aim was to dine an area in which building restrictions 
would have to be imposed, and the task was delegated to the 
Council's consultants, the Ministry of Works and 
Development. Cook County Council imposed a moratorium on 
the issuance of building permits until it received the 
consultant's report, which was completed in June 1981. A 
"100 year hazard zone", ranging from 25 to 55 m wide, was 
recommended for the southern portion of the Beach (where 
most of the houses are situated), as well as the adoption of 
appropriate ordinances in the district planning scheme to 
encourage land uses compatible with the identified coastal 
hazards. It was als0 recommended that the extent of the 
hazard zone be reassessed at each scheme review (every five 
years) having regard to data collected during that time 
(Gibb, 1981(a)). The County Council have endorsed and 
adopted the consultant's report, and a policy statement and 
maps for the hazard zone appear in the proposed review 
district planning scheme (which is shortly to become 
operative). 
At the same time as the consultant's report was being 
prepared, pressure by wainui residents and the Council led 
to the introduction and subsequent enactment of section 641A 
of the Local Government Act 1974. This gave councils 
discretionary power to issue building permits for 
relocatable buildings on present or potentially unstable 
land, subject to any conditions council considers necessary. 
If a permit is granted, details are entered on the 
certificate of title to the land by the District Land 
Registrar. There is also provision for a council to have an 
apparent protection against liability for any future loss. 
Currently Cook County Council are considering building 
permit applications by reference to their location within 
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the identified hazard zone, and sections 641, 641A of the 
Local Government Act 1974. It is their interpretation and 
administration of those two management responses that have 
given rise to the issues, conflicts and problems revealed by 
the interviews. 
3.5 HAZARDS MANAGEMENT AT WAINUI 
CONFLICTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
BEACH ISSUES, 
The history of management responses adopted at Wainui Beach 
has been outlined as it is integral to the current conflicts 
faced by the local authority and affected residents. To 
examine these it is proposed to consider each of the three 
main groups separately. 
3.5.1 Cook County Council 
Under the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 and the Local 
Government Act 1974, the Council has statutory planning 
responsibility for Wainui Beach. 
Sections 641, 641A of the latter Act, and the endorsement of 
a 100 year hazard zone have been the main issues Council has 
had to deal with. 
For the purposes of establishing a policy for the issue of 
building permits the Council has divided the foreshore into 
two categories: 
(i) land subject to an immediate hazard and which also 
forms an integral part of the beach defence 
scheme. It comprises the space immediately behind 
the longitudinal gabions plus a further landward 
strip of 15 m width; and 
(ii) land predicted by the consultant's report (Gibb, 
1981(a» to be subject to erosion within the next 
100 years. 
Although the Council is aware of the implications cau by 
the adoption and administration of the hazard zone, it 
believes its stance is a middle line approach. On the one 
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hand are the interests and individual s of property 
owners, and on the other the statutory requirements of the 
Town and Country Planning Act, and the Local Government Act. 
For example, prior to enactment of section 64lA of the Local 
Government Act, the Council acknowledged that residents' 
interests were suffering more from progressive tightening of 
legislative constraints than from an immediate threat of 
erosion. Because section 641 was so restrictive it was felt 
that properties at the Beach would start to deteriorate 
because of legal obstacles even if the consultant's 
predictions were proved abso accurate. These concerns 
were a major reason for the Council and Wainui residents 
strongly supporting introduction of section 64lA, with its 
discretionary provision for approving building permit 
applications. 
The Council's desire to formally a hazard zone at 
Wainui, to assist it in fulfilling its responsibilities 
under section 641 (and section 64lA), was 
unfavourably received by the residents. 
Council felt that such a zone was necessary if 
However, the 
it were to 
consider building permit applications, and if it were to 
avert a 'decay' of sting homes through restricting 
maintenance. The zone provided a bench-mark against which 
permit applications could be referenced and in adopting it 
as such, a enforcement was made. Fearing that a 
successful application for building inside the hazard zone 
(that is, seaward of the delineated line) would set a 
precedent, and perhaps lead to a claim for negligence if 
subsequent damage or loss occurred, the Council adopted an 
absolute 'no-go' restriction. This apparently protected 
Council from the possibility of a liability claim but made 
it very unpopular with affected residents who claimed 
rights were being restricted and that they were being 
discriminated against. 
This raises some significant points regarding the Council's 
inte on of its planning responsibilities. 
Having received the consultant's report regarding the 
situation at Beach, the Council had a number of 
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options available. rstly, it could have rejected the 
report and recommendations; secondly, it could have accepted 
the report but implemented only some of the recommendations; 
and thirdly, it could have endorsed both the report and 
recommendations in full. The third option was the one the 
Council adopted. 
A first point to be is that although the Council 
received expert advice from a specialist in coastal erosion, 
his expertise does not encompass either engineering or 
planning in any recognised professional sense - for example, 
before the Planning Tribunal. The converse is true for the 
engineer and planner. Thus although the Council has a 
statutory responsibility to act, it does not necessarily 
have to accept and action in full any findings and 
recommendations made by its consultants without also 
considering 
officers. 
the views of its engineering and planning 
However, factors such as lack of understanding 
about coastal processes or unqualified acceptance of 
particular hazard area delineation techniques may result in 
1 , if any, questioning of the report's findings or 
investigation of alternative management strategies. Full 
endorsement and actioning of the expert advice received may, 
t ore, be a 'convenient' management approach to adopt -
in some respects a shelter for not investigating alternative 
hazards management approaches. 
This leads to a second important point concerning the 
Council's 
negl 
protection 
Total 
from claims 
rejection of expert 
liability and 
ce could place 
the Council in a vulnerable position if a claim were made 
since it had been forewarned. On the other hand, total 
acceptance of the advice does not appear to absolve the 
Council from such claims either. The two situations that 
make this tenable are: 
(i) having endorsed the advice and established a 
hazard zone, a severe event erodes more land than 
ineated by that zone; and 
(ii) having endorsed the advice and established a 
hazard zone, erosion does not occur to the extent 
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predicted yet people have been denied use of their 
land through restrictive planning controls being 
enforced. 
Both of these situations are feasible and potentially 
grounds for claims against the Council. Again it is 
suggested that it may be merely a convenience to simply 
accept in full the expert advice received, and make little 
effort to investigate other management approaches. 
Investigation of alternative management approaches is a 
third significant point. Referring back to Chapter Two it 
was noted that responses to hazards were related both to 
perception and to awareness of opportunities to make 
adjustments (see page 13). In the case of Wainui Beach it 
appears that the Council has chosen to consider only one of 
many possible responses in essence the hazard has been 
perceived but there has been little investigation of 
adjustment opportunities. This restrictive 'tunnel vision' 
approach may have resulted in viable management options (for 
example, a strategy incorporating the sting engineering 
works and planning controls) being uninvestigated. In 
addition the approach adopted by the Council has resulted in 
many unforeseen problems concerning individual property 
rights, the equity of the management response, and the role 
of experts in decision-making. Table II classified two 
major hazard adjustment techniques: 
(i) engineering; and 
(ii) social. 
It has been suggested that the first technique is often 
costly, ineffective and may lead to unanticipated s 
ef s. Similar criticisms may be made about the second 
technique, except that the problems are more likely to 
affect the human resource rather than the physical resource. 
Thus, limiting management strategies to exclusive responses 
poses considerable implications and restricts development of 
complementary approaches. 
Statutory planning responsibi ty for hazardous areas mean 
councils everywhere are concerned about ways of protecting 
themselves from liability and negligence claims. It is 
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clear that all local authorities are mindful of decisions 
such as Dutton v Bognor Regis Urban District Council,l Anns v London 
Borough of Merton,2 Junior Books Ltd v veitchi Co. Ltd,3 Pirelli 
General Cable Works Ltd v Oscar Faber and Partners, 4 and Fellowes 
v Rother District Council. 5 
The Dutton case was the first instance where a Council was 
held liable for negligent approval of plans and negligence 
in inspection (in this instance for a house on top of a 
filled-in rubbish tip). Of particular significance was that 
it showed that not only could local authorities be legally 
liable for physical loss or damage as a direct result of 
local authority activities, but also for the indirect 
results of local authority activities due to negligent acts, 
accidental errors or omissions being committed by local 
authority employees in or about their duties. 
Since then other cases have consolidated the Dutton ruling, 
and extended various matters relating to negligence. 2 ,3,4,5 
New Zealand legal precedents which supported the English 
judgement in Dutton v Bognor Regis became established by: 
(i) Hope v Manukau City Council;6 
(ii) Johnson v Mount Albert Borough Council; 7 and 
(iii) Mount Albert Borough Council v Johnson B 
which introduced firmly the English decisions into New 
Zealand. 
Having decided to fully endorse the findings of the 
consultant's report and accept the recommended hazard zone, 
a draft policy statement for the Wainui Erosion Hazard Area 
was advertised for submissions and objections in 1982. 
1. [1971] 2 All [1972] 1 All ER 462. 
2. [1977] 2 All 
3 . [ 1982] 3 All 
4 . [ 1983] 1 All 
5 . [ 1983] 1 All 
6. Supreme Court, Auckland, A 1553/73, 2 August 1976, 
Chilwell Ji [1976] New Zealand Recent Law 324. 
7. [1977] 2 NZLR 530. 
8. [1979] 2 NZLR 234; [1980] New Zealand Recent Law 35. 
Cases cited are referenced according to legal convention, as 
explained in Appendix I. 
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Following a hearing in late 1983 the Council reject 
draft policy into 
probably have 
all 
the 
been 
objections and 
proposed review 
resolved to adopt the 
scheme. It would 
inconsistent for the Council not to have done so, given its 
commitment to the hazard zone, and the apparent implications 
of negligence and liability claims. 
The strict enforcement of this zone has been relaxed 
recently so that some minor building additions and alter-
ations to existing residences have been allowed, subject to 
the provisions of section 641A of the Local Government Act 
1974. No new non-relocatable buildings are likely to be 
permitted. This flexibility has placated affected residents 
to some extent but the Council is treating each case on its 
merits, having regard to statutory responsibilities and 
potential liability claims. 
If loss of property did occur at Wainui, those Council 
officers interviewed stated 
sources would be unlikely 
affected. In contrast, if a 
houses and/or property were 
likelihood of a disaster fund 
established after the 1984 
that compensation from 
if only one or two houses 
significant proportion of 
endangered, there would be 
being set up (similar to 
Southland flood) . It was 
local 
were 
the 
more 
that 
felt 
unlikely that the Council would consider purchasing or 
relocating endangered buildings because of the ~ost and the 
end result of being left with a parcel of 'useless' land. 
Finally, insurance was not accepted as providing any 
'backstop' for residents since the Earthquake and War Damage 
Commission would be unlikely to accept claims for loss of 
land or buildings by erosion, subsidence or inundation. 
This was also felt to be true for private insurance 
companies. 
Thus, the discussion in this section has pointed out several 
implications for the Council arising from its adoption of a 
hazard line and supporting policy: 
(i) the Council acknowledges that it must balance the 
interests and rights of affected residents, and 
its statutory planning responsibilities; 
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(ii) it would appear that the Council adopted a rather 
restricted consideration of management approaches 
and may have chosen to endorse and action in full 
the report and recommendations of its consultant 
without investigation of other options; 
(iii) an earlier stance of s ct enforcement, and 
latterly a more flexible approach, in assessing 
building permit applications has left many Wainui 
residents disillusioned and angry about the 
Council's interest for residents; and 
(iv) the Council appears to be adopting a 'wait and 
see' attitude regarding the future of the beach 
houses. Although is using the defined hazard 
zone as a bench-mark assessing building permit 
applications, aff residents are in effect 
facing a do-nothing option since the hazard zone 
does not assist them in dealing with or preparing 
for short- and long-term erosion problems. The 
Council does not seem to be investigating possible 
solutions to this, and it appears only severe 
damage to property (as happened in the 1955 storm) 
will mot positive action. For Wainui 
residents this may be too little, too late. 
3.5.2 Wainui Beach residents 
It was not until section 641 of the Local Government Act 
came into effect in 1980 that residents became conce 
about their Council's planning actions. They were already 
aware of the erosion hazard since annual levies were made 
for the maintenance of the longitudinal protection works 
(gabions), and also because the County Council annually 
asked installments on the loan raised to design and 
install the spur groynes. The implications of the hazard 
for property owners were less appreciated, however. 
Building permit applications were considered by reference to 
an informal hazard line but seemed relatively easy to 
obtain. 
After section 641 became law the situation for residents 
became very restrictive since a Council had to administer 
slation apparently prohibiting maintenance or relocation 
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of a house further back from the foredune. Intense lobbying 
by residents and the Cook County Council saw enactment of 
section 641A in 1981. However, the residents' satisfaction 
with this concession was abruptly halted by the announcement 
of the Council's intention to engage a consultant to 
formally identify a hazard zone to assist in meeting 
statutory planning requirements. The conflicts were about 
to emerge as residents perceived their individual and 
democratic rights, and financial interests being threatened. 
Paramount was the issue of the extent of rights local and 
central Government have to intervene and restrict the 
freedoms of individuals to do what they like on their 
property. 
Cook County Council's endorsement, interpretation and 
administration of the hazard zone have been the principal 
concerns of residents, particularly in regard to: 
(i) the width of the hazard zone; 
(ii) the adequacy of the used to derive the hazard 
zone, and the possible influences of local events; 
(iii) the effects of sea level rise, land uplift, 
abnormally high tides, plate tectonics; 
(iv) disregarding any influence foredune protection 
works may have in 
events; 
ng the impacts of severe 
(v) the use and relevance a 100 year reference to 
define the extent of the hazard zone; 
(vi) the delineation of the zone through parts of 
houses, buildings or sections; 
(vii) property valuations and rate demands; and 
(viii) the provisions of section 641A which, it is felt, 
absolve the Council from any subsequent risks, 
damages and civil claims if a building permit is 
approved. 
A discussion of t 
As noted previously 
along the southern 
34-37). For many 
e points is maqe below. 
the hazard zone ranges from 25 m to 55 m 
of Wainui Beach (see Gibb, 1981(a): 
residents this width for the zone was 
difficult to accept, not only because of its technical 
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derivation but also because it contrasted so greatly with 
their personal observations and knowledge of local erosion 
rates. The need for a hazard zone was accepted by most of 
the people; the extent of the adopted zone was, however, 
seen as an overstatement of the situation. Further, it was 
contended that the degree and imminence of risk vary across 
the width of a hazard zone with front row houses being more 
at risk than those located further back. However, in 
delineating the zone all houses in that part of the zone are 
treated the same irrespective of location on the section. 
In fairness to the concept of identifying hazard areas, 
however, it would be difficult to adopt any other view. 
The width of the zone was a 0 questioned because of the 
emphasis placed on a series of air photos, taken over a 
relatively short time span from 1942 to 1981 as a major 
input for establishing the zone. Specifically the aerial 
surveys were made in 1942, 1953, 1966, 1972 and 1981. 
Clearly the intervals between each survey were unequal and 
this raises a general point about the use of air photo 
surveys to estimate the net trend of shoreline changes: 
ideally the time intervals should be equal, together with a 
lengthy record of surveys to allow useful inter-comparisons 
between them. In the case of Wainui Beach there are five 
photos covering a 39 year period, so that the questions to 
be asked are: 
(i) How well does this describe the last 39 years?; 
and 
(ii) Since the Council has chosen to base its planning 
controls on a 100 year predicted line, how well 
does it represent the situation for the next 100 
years? 
Leading on from the questions posed above the conflict was 
compounded by the use of the coastal hazard zone mapping 
technique, which uses a time period of 100 years to derive 
the 'line beyond which the shoreline (seaward limit of land 
vegetation) is not expected to lie' (Gibb, 1981(a):34), 
since few people could see the relevance of adopting such a 
long time interval on which to base current planning 
controls. 
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Questions were also raised about the dangers of 'predicting' 
the erosion as an average and constant rate of change. It 
was suggested that it may either be a series of discrete 
events, or be mitigated to some extent by foredune 
protection works. In either case the effect would be to 
cast doubt on the accuracy of any proposed hazard zone 
width. 
A further issue concerned the air photo data us to derive 
the hazard zone, particularly the degree reliance and 
validity to placed on having only 39 years of 
information. Also the luence of local events such as 
sand mining in the 1920's and 1930's, and earthquake damage 
in 1947 were suggested as contributing factors to erosion 
which were not accounted for. This raised the question of 
how well t available a photo record might assist in 
indicating the situation 100 years hence? Kirk (1982), for 
example, has pointed to some of the problems posed by the 
paucity of historical information on much of the New Zealand 
coast: problems in making ous data sources such as old 
maps, deposited survey plans and air photos strictly 
comparable and the errors which arise in the measurements; 
and the clustering of the available historical data from the 
1930's onwards. 
Thus, is frequent difficult to distinguish short-term 
fluctuations around a stable beach pos ion from longer-term 
sequences of erosion or accretion of the beach as a whole. 
Extrapolation of avai information for planning purposes 
requires discretion, therefore, for two important reasons. 
First, the difficulty of distinguishing short-term changes 
from any longer-term trends of erosion or accretion, and 
second, the problem of how representative the historical 
record is in indicating the net trend of shorel change 
over time. 
Additionally, there is a question concerning the cumulative 
influence of local events on beach state, and on any 
hazard zone delineations made. The local events cited for 
Wainui Beach demonstrated the implications of this question 
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because they illustrate how such neations may be under-
or over-estimates if significant past events were not 
considered. 
Long-term 'macro' level influences, such as sea level rise 
and land uplift, were seen as having an effect on the 
erosion rate particularly when considered with erosion of 
the Tuahine and Makarori headlands. It was felt that these 
factors would affect the shape of the beach (since the rate 
of each 'macro' event affects the amount of land potentially 
erodable), and thus the extent of the hazard zone. Again 
this posed the question of the relevance of a lOO-year 
prediction - except this it was not extrapolation, but 
interpolation of time sca s that was at issue. 
In calculating the hazard zone, the consultants chose to 
ignore the existing longitudinal protection works (gabions). 
Because they were designed and constructed to withstand only 
moderately severe storms it was believed that it would be 
unwise to place any on them. Residents, on 
other hand, felt the works should have been cons 
This reaction was not unexpected since they are paying for 
the works, but the residents argued that the gabions have 
reduced the effects of erosion since they were installed. 
Their action in the winter storms of 1978 was c as a 
good example, as well as a Catchment Board report stating 
that since the works were constructed there has been no 
significant erosion of the sand dune in the protected area 
(see East Cape Catchment Board 1981(b):2). In proposing a 
revision of the hazard zone the Beach Front Property Owners 
and Residents group have maintained that the works are 
having a posi effect in mitigating erosion and must be 
taken account of. To date the Council and the consultants 
reject this on the grounds that the gabions were 
designed and constructed for a specific period and set of 
conditions, and that it has not been possible to assess the 
extent to which the works may be reducing erosion. 
A particularly contentious implication of the hazard zone 
has been the use of a lOO-year period to f its extent. 
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There was total agreement amongst residents that this was 
irrelevant because 100-years was too far into the future on 
which to establish a hazard zone, and it was seen as 
inequitable because it ef tively restricted residents' 
aspirations to make improvements or additions to property 
within their lifetimes. In effect, the adoption of the 
100-year line was viewed as a 'ball and chain' on individual 
property ghts. Despite the consultant's assertions that 
the 100 year period reflects the useful life of a modern 
dwelling, and that in the case of Wainui there is one 
property that has stood for 75 years (and should stand for 
another 75), residents did not accept a need to establish 
such an inappropriate time span. They preferred that any 
hazard zone should be established for a more reasonable 
period ranging from 20 to 50 years, to be reviewable at 
5-yearly intervals. The reviews would take into account the 
effects the gabions were having, the beach profile and sand 
volume data of the Catchment Board, and other relevant 
information. Appropriate changes to the position of the 
zone would then be made. Effectively the Residents' group 
were seeking a 'rolling review' of the situation so that 
updates could be made as new information carne to hand and 
trends became evident. Although the Council and the 
consultants have refused to reposition the hazard zone, the 
Council has conceded that a 'rolling review' merits 
consideration and u meetings between them and the 
Residents' group are proceeding. 
The question of the appropriateness of a 100-year time 
period, or indeed any time period, for basing planning and 
management controls remains unresolved. The Council appears 
to have sidestepped the issue for the time-being by agreeing 
to a 'rolling review' but it is almost certain to arise 
again when the proposed review scheme itself becomes due for 
review. It is quite possible too that the question of 
basing zoning restrictions on a 100-year predicted line will 
become significant at other coastal sites where the hazard 
zone mapping technique is used, particularly if a severe 
event were to remove a greater portion of land than actually 
delineated by the hazard zone. The implications of this for 
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the local authority and the Ministry of Works and 
Development, especially concerning civil liability claims, 
appears daunting. 
Residents also objected to the hazard zone delineation 
dividing parts of houses, buildings or sections. It was 
seen as unfair since residents believed the above should 
either be wholly inside or outside the zone, not divided 
between the two. As the situation stands residents find 
they can carry out additions or alterations, subject to 
usual planning controls, for perhaps one-third of their 
house and not be allowed to do so for the other two-thirds. 
However, it was suggested, that if the council administered 
the line more flexibly by assessing each permit application 
on its merits the residents could accept the delineated 
zone. Presumably this was based on a view that the Council, 
after considering the effects of the proposal, might grant 
permits for minor works or works nearest the landward 
boundary of the zone. One landowner was recently granted a 
permit for a work falling under this latter category and it 
remains to be seen how the Council, having regard to this 
precedent, will deal with other permit applications. 
A further area of concern to residents has been the apparent 
non-effect of the hazard zoning on reducing property 
valuation and rate figures. 
In 1983 the Valuation Department completed a revaluation of 
properties at the Beach. For most properties the land value 
had increased substantially, in some cases almost doubling. 
Although some increase was anticipated, the extent of the 
actual revaluations took most residents by surprise since it 
was felt the imposition of the hazard zone would act to 
lower property values. This belief was based on the view 
that since the Council was enforcing strictly the planning 
controls when considering building permit applications, 
property values should not increase very much, if at all, 
because no improvements had been possible. In addition it 
was believed that the delineation of the zone in the 
proposed review district scheme would deter prospective 
buyers, or at least cause them to offer much less than the 
property was worth. A total of 28 objections were lodged 
with the Valuation Department stating that the land 
valuations were too highi none have been amended, however 
(Laing, Valuation Department (Gisborne), pers.comm., 1984). 
Associated with the new valuations have been higher rate 
demands since Cook County Council bases its rating schedule 
on these figures. Accounts for rates were sent out in April 
but it was not pos ble to obtain the figures. It is 
suggested, however, that since the Council uses t 
valuations to set its rates the residents were faced with a 
substantially higher account. Reactions were probably 
similar to those when the new valuations were released 
dismay that even though they have to accept restrictive 
planning controls, the valuations and rates for their 
property have continued to escalate rapidly. In regard to 
the rates issue, however, it was possibly all the more 
difficult for residents to accept because on the one hand 
Council had severely limited improvement opportunities and 
yet on the other hand was asking for higher rates. 
In essence, by adopting the hazard zone and using valuations 
as the basis for setting rates, the Council may be getting 
the best of two situations - reducing potential liability 
for civil claims, and increasing its rating revenue. The 
equity of this for Wainui residents is a debatable question. 
A final issue raised by residents was the provisions of 
section 641A of the Local Government Act 1974. This section 
gives councils discretionary power to issue building permits 
for relocatable buildings, and apparent indemnity if 
subsequent damage occurs (the latter point is still 
unresolved by legal opinion in regard to third party 
liability) . 
Wainui residents were a major i luence in getting this 
section enacted. Once established they felt this section 
provided the Council with the protection it needed when 
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approving 
certificate 
permit app 
of title 
cations, particularly as the 
to the land would indicate that a 
permit had been approved under section 641A. This entry 
would, it was felt, completely absolve a Council from any 
claims liability and negligence. The Council, however, 
was doubtful of this and is actively seeking legal opinions 
on the matter. 
This raises a general ques on about the use of sections 641 
and 641A approving building permit app cations - if a 
council es out all the actions set out in those two 
sections, does this not only absolve the council from 
liability claims but also de facto absolve it from any 
further or effort to investigate means of controlling 
the erosion? It appears that use of these two sections 
provide for the short-term use of land but do not place any 
responsibil on councils to investigate the causes of the 
erosion or to consider· options for controlling erosion, by 
perhaps a combination of approaches, in the longer term. In 
effect, then, approvals for permits under these sections 
amount to litt more than treating the symptoms and not the 
causes of the hazard. Such an approach may result in a 
rather narrow set of management approaches being proposed 
and implemented by decision-makers. It is appropriate to 
emphasize again the point made in Chapter Two regarding 
hazard responses perception 
opportunities to make adjustments 
factors. 
For beach-front 
the answer to the 
residents, then, s 
hopes. Many 
and the awareness of 
are the two critical 
on 641A has not been 
residents would make 
additions or alterations to their homes under this section 
if they could, and be willing to sign an indemnity aga 
the Councili indeed they feel this provision already exists. 
Further it was be eved that once they had signed an 
indemnity, this impl tly recognized that there was no 
come-back on the Council. The desire to do as they wished 
with their property, within common sense, was emphasized 
frequently. This included rebuilding if loss of property or 
f destroyed their house. 
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Frustration with the manner in which the Council was 
interpreting and implementing sections 641, 64lA and the 
hazard zone peaked when the Residents' group lodged an 
objection to the Wainui Erosion Hazard Area shown in the 
proposed review district scheme (see Appendix II). Their 
objection was based on the assertion that use of section 641 
and the hazard zone to derive the Hazard Area discriminated 
against beach front properties. The proposed alternative 
was a new hazard zone substantially closer to the sea, 
related to the likely position of the foreshore in 20 years 
time, after taking account of protection works and updated 
data on factors used to def the present hazard zone. 
After a hearing in March, 1983 the Council notified the 
Residents' group in September that their objection had been 
disallowed. At this point the group lodged an appeal to the 
Planning Tribunal. However, at the same time the group 
resumed discussions with the Council on the feasibility of 
considering a "rolling review' of the hazard zone based on 
5-yearly reviews of the situation. As yet the Council have 
not formally committed themselves to this proposal, although 
discus ons are proceeding. Clearly, then, both parties 
believe there is room for negotiation and compromise and 
that a satisfactory solution can be implemented. 
3.5.3 Ad hoc agencies and Government departments 
Included in this section are the East Cape Catchment Board 
and the Valuation Department. 
The East Cape Catchment Board endorsed the hazard zone as 
f rly representing the likely natural location of the 
foredune in 100 years time, as well as stressing that the 
protection works were designed and constructed to buffer 
moderate storms only. They did not offer any opinion about 
the validity of ignoring any effect the works may have in 
reducing erosion, or whether the hazard zoning should have 
taken some account of them. It appears, therefore, that the 
Board preferred to avoid getting involved in the issue and 
was content to merely reiterate its responsibilities for 
maintenance of the protection works, and present information 
on sand levels and beach profiles. 
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Involvement of the Valuation Department's district office 
has been confined to the latest revaluations, and objections 
sing from this. It appeared that beach front residents 
were not aware that their valuations were based on house 
sales adjacent to the hazard zone, with a 7% reduction to 
reflect zone designation. Because homes at Wainui, both 
inside and outside the hazard zone, sell quickly and 
high prices it was not surprising that all valuations should 
increase. This emphasizes how popular the beach is to home-
buyers who, it seems, are prepared to accept the possi lity 
of erosion as a fact of purchasing sea front property. It 
also emphasizes that the hazard zone here really has had no 
major negative effect on property values, despite residents' 
fear to the contrary; it would be interesting to investigate 
this for other beaches with an identified hazard zone. 
Although 28 objections were received by the Department, 17 
were subsequently withdrawn with no change in values and 11 
are outstanding (Laing, Valuation Department (Gisborne), 
pers.comm., 1984). 
However unfair it may seem to base valuations on the sales 
of surrounding property, it should be recognised that this 
procedure follows the provisions of the Valuation of Land 
Act 1953 and its 1977 amendment. This is not to say that 
revi procedures more appropriate to circumstances are 
not needed because, although more coastal subdivisions are 
having hazard zones delineated, a beach front home is 11 
regarded as prime real estate. 
3.6 SUMMARY 
Wainui Beach was used as a case-study of a seaside community 
faced with a coastal erosion hazard. An examination was 
made of the management approaches that have been adopted, 
before discussing the issues, conf cts and implications of 
the current planning response. It was seen that there were 
three main parties involved: 
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(i) the Cook County Council, who had statutory 
planning responsibility for the area and who have 
adopted a hazard zone to assist them in carrying 
out this function; 
(ii) local residents affected by the delineation of the 
hazard zone; and 
(iii) the East Cape Catchment Board, and the district 
office of the Valuation Department. 
The implications of the Council's adoption of the ha~ard 
zone were outlined for each party. These can be summarised 
as: 
(i) Cook County Council wanted to adopt a middle line 
approach - on the one hand carrying out statutory 
planning duties under the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1977 and the Local Government Act 
1974, and on the other hand recognising and taking 
account of individual property ghts of Wainui 
residents. Use of the hazard zone to assess 
building permit applications was seen as a 
feasib means of performing both. 
(ii) Residents living within the area shown by the 
hazard zone were concerned that the Council was 
treating them unfairly. The basis for this 
viewpoint was that Council's endorsement, 
interpretation and administration of the zone was 
placing severe restrictions 6n their rights to do 
as they wished with their property, particularly 
as it was felt that granting building permits 
under section 641A of the Local Government Act 
1974 absolved the Council from any civil liability 
claims. The need for a hazard zone was accepted; 
the usefulness and relevance of adopting a 100 
year riod in deriving the zone, however, was 
strongly challenged as was the ignorance of any 
influence the longitud 1 protection works may 
have in reducing erosion. Questions about the 
validity of the method and data used to define the 
zone were also raised. 
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Arising from their frustrations with the Council's 
adminstration of the zone, the Residents' group 
lodged an appeal to the Planning Tribunal. This 
action followed an earlier objection to the 
Council concerning an Erosion Hazard Area 
de gnated in the propos review district scheme 
which was disallowed. A regular 'rolling review' 
of the zone has been proposed as an acceptable 
compromise to the residents. 
(iii) The East Cape Catchment Board 
adopted a neutral stance. At meetings 
correspondence they repeatedly re 
responsibility for collecting monies 
to have 
and in 
their 
for 
maintaining the longitudinal protection works, and 
accepted that the works should not be considered 
in any calculation of the hazard zone. They 
stressed that this was because their sign limit 
was only to buf moderate storms. 
A recent revaluation of properties at Wainui meant 
the district office of the Valuation Department 
became involved in the hazard zone issue. Because 
valuations are based on house sales in an area, 
the popularity and high prices for homes at Wainui 
have substantially raised valuations of homes 
inside the zone. Further, because the Cook 
County Council bases its rates on the valuation 
figures, residents 
rate demand. 
were faced with an increased 
The case-study also 
the relation between 
hazards theory_ 
sed some general points concerning 
the adopted management responses and 
It was suggested that the Cook County Council may have 
considered a narrow set of management alternatives, which 
restricted the options available to local decision-makers to 
choose from. This was a significant point since response to 
hazards is related both to perception and to an awareness of 
opportunities to make adjustments. Thus, the adoption of a 
'tunnel vision' approach to management may unnecessarily 
preclude the consideration of alternative hazards responses 
that could be more appropriate to situation. 
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Wainui Beach represents an example of a coastal community 
that has gone beyond a 'technological response' phase of 
relying solely on protective works, with the adoption of 
planning controls for a defined hazard zone. Both of se 
responses have been made independently of each other, 
however. It would appear that the opportunity to uti se 
both types of responses, in combination, as a management 
alternative was dismissed as being unrealistic. In an 
fort to make the human-use system less vulnerable to the 
effects of severe natural events, however, the promotion of 
multiple adjustments to a hazard would not seem 
unreasonable. In the case of Wainui the protective works 
and the planning controls encompass two types 
adjustments: those that modi the hazard, and those that 
modify loss potential (see Table II). A detailed study 
the combination of the two as a management option would 
been useful to broaden the of alternatives considered, 
in addition to study of other types of possible adjustments. 
In this manner the awareness of opportunities to make 
adjustments would have been increased. 
It was seen, therefore, that reliance on firstl~ a 
technical response and latterl~a planning reponse has not 
resulted in an approach that satisfies either the Cook 
County Councilor affected Wainui residents. In fact, the 
present management response has exacerbated the issues and 
conflicts associated with the adopted approach. In part 
this may be due not only to a limited review of alternative 
management options, but also as a consequence of the 
relevant legislation the Council must implement and 
administer. 
The legal and institutional aspects of coastal hazards 
management describes those matters a local authority must 
have regard to and/or administer. Thus, the statutory 
requirements play an important role in defining the nature 
and extent of a council's responsibility for management. 
These requirements are examined in the following chapter 
since many of the issues raised in the case-study are 
founded on the hazards slation and policies that have 
been enacted. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF COASTAL 
HAZARDS MANAGEMENT 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
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The case-study on Wainui Beach, Gisborne highlighted a 
number of issues, conflicts and implications arising from 
the present management approaches. It is important to 
recognise, however, that those approaches are to a large 
extent based on the relevant legislation and policies that 
administering agencies must implement. An examination of 
the legal and institutional aspects of coastal hazards 
management is therefore relevant since it defines the nature 
and limits of the administering agencies responsibilities. 
This chapter considers these aspects by reference to two 
factors: 
(i) relevant statutes and planning responsibilities; 
and 
(ii) policies of hazards management agencies. 
Finally, by way of a comment on the chapter's main points, 
some observations of the above two factors are presented. 
4.2 RELEVANT STATUTES AND PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES 
There are five principal statutes relevant to coastal 
hazards management. They are the Soil Conservation and 
Rivers Control Act 1941; the Harbours Act 1950; the Water 
and Soil Conservation Act 1967; the Local Government Act 
1974; and the Town and Country Planning Act 1977. 
4.2.1 The Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941 
This Act and its various amendments was enacted to, inter 
alia, make better provision for the protection of property 
from damage by floods. 
A Soil Conservation and Rivers 
established (section 3) and charged 
(section 10), functions (section 
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Control Council was 
with specific objects 
11), and powers in 
connection with watercourses and defences against water 
(section 22); of relevance are the following 
responsibilities: 
(a) The prevention of damage by floods (section 10(C))i 
(b) The investigation and design of measures for 
preventing or reducing flood damage or reinstating 
property so damaged or controlling the water table 
in relation to any land (section ll(d)); 
(c) The assistance of persons whose land has been 
affected by soil erosion or floods or whose land may 
be used to fuller capacity by the control of water 
thereto (section ll(h)); 
(d) The general supervision and control of Catchment 
Board activities (section ll(k)); 
(e) The power to deepen, widen, straighten, divert, or 
otherwise improve any watercourse or outfall for 
water, or remove any obstructions to the above 
including obstructions to t free flow of flood 
waters in existing flood channels. In addition 
Council has the power to se, widen, or otherwise 
improve any defence against water (section 22(b))i 
(f) The authority to make any new watercourse or outfall 
for water to allow it to connect with the sea or any 
arm of it, or with any other watercourse or a lake. 
Council may also erect any new defence against 
water, or carry out any other work considered 
necessary or desirable for controlling or preventing 
damage by flood waters (section 22(c))i and 
(g) Authority to make grants or loans towards cost 
of coastal erosion control works, either directly to 
any person or body, or through a catchment authority 
or regional water board. (section 30). This 
provision, however, is qualified by a National Water 
and Soil Conservation Authority (NWASCA) pol that 
c for the protection of urban development 
init after 18 November 1971, and for 
resettlement of persons affected by marine erosion 
or flooding are ineligible for grants and loans. 
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The Act also estab shed catchment districts (section 34) 
and catchment boards (section 40) with certain powers and 
duties (Part VII). 
Generally catchment boards have the same functions and 
responsibilities as Soil Conservation and Rivers Control 
Council, except on a local rather than national level (see 
in particular sections 126 ('General powers of Catchment 
Boards'); 130 ('Governor-General may vest control of water-
courses in Boards'), and 133 ('Maintenance and improvement 
of watercourses and defences against water, etc.' ». 
Under Part VIII of the Act catchment boards may make bylaws 
for the protection of watercourses and defences against 
water (section 149), as well as bylaws relating to land 
utilisation (section 150). Both sections aim at reducing or 
preventing the damaging ef of floods by controlling 
actions on or adjacent to watercourses. 
In 1959 and 1980 the Act was amended to introduce sections 
relating to safeguards against erosion and flooding (see the 
Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Amendment Act 1959, and 
1980). Particularly important are sections 34 ('Safeguards 
publicly notified') and 35 ('Individual notices of 
safeguards'). Basically section 34 states that the occupier 
of any land in any catchment district or territory 
carry out every operation affecting the land in conformity 
with prudent land use practice and prevent or mitigate, 
inter alia, deposition in watercourses, lakes, or the sea, 
and the control of floods. No person shall carry out any 
activity publicly notified within the immediately preceding 
two years if it is likely to facilitate soil erosion or 
floods, or cause deposits in watercourses, lakes or the sea 
unless prior consent from the Catchment Board, Commission or 
Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Council has been 
obtained. In order to check erosion, whether by landslip, 
water, wind or otherwise, or to check deposits in 
watercourses, lakes or the sea, or to promote flood control 
s 35 allows the Council to require any change, 
prohibition, restriction or regulation in land use. Notice 
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in writing to such effect shall be given to the present 
occupier of the land and various actions may be specified 
which are to be carried out within a certain t period. 
Finally, it should be noted that a 1983 amendment to the 
principal 1941 Act has placed the Soil Conservation and 
Rivers Control Council within the responsibil es of an 
enlarged National Water and Soil Conservation Authority, 
although its role and functions remain unchanged (see Soil 
and Water 20(2), 1984:27-29, 30-34, 35-36). 
4.2.2 The Harbours Act 1950 
Under section 176 of this Act it is an offence to construct 
any works or structures in, on, over, through, or across 
tidal lands, tidal waters, or the bed or the waters of the 
sea, or of any harbour, navigab lake or navigable river 
unless authorisation has been received from the Minister of 
Transport. This means that any coastal protection scheme 
containing works that impinge into any of the above areas 
will need to be scrutinised and approved by the Harbours and 
Foreshores Section of the Ministry of Transport, in addition 
to satisfying any other conditions imposed by other agencies 
(for example, meeting the National Water and Soil 
Conservation Authority's financing and maintenance 
provisions for such works). 
4.2.3 The Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 
The Long Title to this Act notes that the prevention of 
damage by flood and erosion is one of the many 
responsibilities vested in administering bodies. 
Section 14 details the functions, powers etc. of the 
National Water and Soil Conservation Authority (NWASCA), and 
notes that it shall have all the functions, rights, powers 
and duties the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control 
Council (SCRCC) (section 14(1». 
Provision is made for investigating problems concerning the 
control of erosion on the banks of rivers, lake shores and 
the sea shore as well as controlling the flow and flooding 
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in and from rivers and lakes (section l4(3)(a». In 
addition section l4(3)(e) gives NWASCA the function and 
power to: 
' ... exercise, in relation to erosion, 
accretion, and pollution in estuaries and on 
the sea front and in all other places within 
the outer limits of the territorial sea of New 
Zealand, all of the functions and powers 
conferred in the Soil Conservation and Rivers 
Control Council ... as if those functions and 
powers extended to the said estuaries, sea 
fronts, and places.' 
It is a statutory function of the 20 catchment authorities 
and regional water boards throughout New Zealand to 
administer the functions and duties of NWASCA and the SCRCC 
as delegated to them by these bodies. 
4.2.4 The Local Government Act 1974 
There are four sections'of this Act relevant to the present 
study; they are 
(i) section 274 ('Subdivision not to be permitted in 
certain circumstances'): 
(ii) section 641 ('Refusal of building permit'); 
(iii) section 64lA ('Power to issue building permit 
where land subject to erosion, subsidence, 
slippage or inundation'); and 
(iv) section 684 ('Subject matter of bylaws'). 
Section 274 notes that a council shall refuse to approve any 
scheme plan if it is satisfied that the land on the plan is 
not suitable for subdivision, or that the proposed 
subdivision is contrary 
district planning scheme. 
withheld if the land or any 
to any proposed or operative 
In addition approval shall be 
portion of it in the subdivision 
is subject to erosion, subsidence, slippage, or inundation 
by the sea, a river, stream, lake or any other source. This 
requirement extends also to include situations where a 
council is satisfied that subdivision is likely to 
accelerate, worsen, or result in any of the above events to 
land not part of the subdivision. However, approval for 
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subdivision may be granted if council is satisfied that 
provision has been, or will be, made for the protection of 
the land (whether part of the subdivision or not) from 
erosion, subsidence, slippage or inundation (writer's 
emphasis) . 
Under section 641(2) a council shall refuse to grant a 
permit for the erection or alteration of any building where: 
(i) the land or the part of the land where the 
building is to be erected or altered is 
unsuitable, unless council believes 
provision has been, or will be, made to 
land suitable for the proposal; 
emphasis) 
adequate 
make the 
(writer's 
(ii) the proposed building or alteration is presently 
or potentially at risk from damage arising 
directly or indirectly from erosion, subsidence, 
or slippage of the land on which it is sited. A 
permit shall also be refused if inundation from 
such events is likely, or if the proposal may 
accelerate, worsen, or result in erosion, 
subsidence, slippage or inundation of the site or 
any other land. If a council is satisfied that 
adequate provision has been, or is to be, made for 
the prevention or protection of land from such 
events, however, it may grant a permit. 
It should be noted that this section makes the refusal of 
building permits mandatory if a council believes any of the 
above threats apply to a particular site and if no provision 
has been made to make the site suitable. Further, the 
emphasis is primarily on protection of the land rather than 
protection of buildings - a point stressed by the Planning 
Tribunal in Southland County Council v Southland County Council 9 : 
I ••• to some extent the legislative intent 
behind s641(2) is the protection of buildings. 
But it is also the protection of land from the 
consequences of building activity. Obviously if 
land is protected ... ,then the building erected 
on that land will also be protected.' 
9. (1981) 8 NZTPA 61 at 64. 
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A discretionary power for councils to issue permits 
relocatable buildings is provided by section 641A. Subject 
to any conditions set, a permit for a relocatable bui ng 
may be given for the erection of a building on any land or 
part of any land that is or will be subject to: 
(i) erosion; 
(ii) subsidence; 
(iii) slippage; or 
(iv) inundation arising from the erosion, subsidence, 
or slippage of that land. 
Under this section a building permit may be issued for: 
(i) the alteration of a building; 
(ii) the erection of another building on the same site 
consistent with the use and occupation of the 
exi ng building; 
(iii) the restoration of any damage suffered by that 
building; or 
(iv) the re ting of a building on its existing site. 
If a permit is approved the council is required to notify 
the District Land Registrar who shall make an entry on the 
certificate of tle to the land that a building permit has 
been issued under this section. Provided that this 
notification (which is mandatory) has not been rescinded, 
and that the other requirements have been met, subsection 3 
exonerates local authorities from 'civil liability to any 
person having an interest in that building' on the grounds 
that a council was negligent in issuing the permit. It is 
uncertain, however, whether the council would be released 
from liability should someone who did not have an interest 
in the building which was erected or altered suffer loss or 
damage, that is, third party 1 lity. To date, this 
que on remains unresolved. 
Section 684 concerning the subject-matter of bylaws is the 
final section of relevance here. Of particular significance 
are powers to make bylaws for the protection from damage, 
injury or misappropr on of any property belonging to, or 
controlled by, the council (subsection 6); the inspection of 
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any land, building, or premises for any purpose of this Act 
(subsection 21): and prescribing any conditions for the 
control, prevention or protection of land from slippage 
(subsection 25). 
4.2.5 The Town and Country Planning Act 1977 
This Act is principally concerned with the preparation, 
implementation, and administration of regional, district, 
and maritime planning schemes. with regard to this study 
sections 3, 36, 90, 91, the First Schedule (clause 4(c», 
and the Second and Third Schedules, (clause S(a» are 
significant. 
Matters of national importance are set out in section 3, 
which notes that 'The wise use and management of New 
Zealand's resources ... The preservation of the natural 
character of the coastal environment and the margins of 
lakes and rivers and the protection of them from unnecessary 
subdivision and development' shall be recognised and 
provided for in planning schemes. 
The contents of district planning schemes are outlined in 
section 36. In addition to making provision for matters 
laid out in the Second Schedule there are specific require-
ments regarding what shall be included in schemes; for 
example, a statement of the scheme's objectives and purposes 
and the policies to achieve them. 
When district schemes become due for review it is not 
unusual for councils to review their zoning of particular 
areas. However, existing uses within those zones are 
protected by sections 90 and 91 which allow the established 
use to continue provided certain conditions are met. If an 
area is rezoned, the existing uses now become non-conforming 
to the new zone designation: section 91, however, provides 
for the right to reconstruct, alter, or add to an existing 
building according to specific conditions. 
An operative district scheme may be changed by the council 
seeking to introduce a variation to a particular zoning. 
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Again, so long as the uses in the zone were lawfully 
established, sections 90 and 91 protect the rights of 
existing uses. 
The First, Second and Third Schedules, which set out matters 
to be dealt with in regional, district, and maritime 
planning schemes respectively, also deal with 
hazards. 
natural 
Specifically, clause 4(c) of the First Schedule allows for 
the 'General identification of areas to be excluded from 
future urban development, including ... land subject to hazard 
such as flooding and earth movement ... ' 
Appropriate provisions for natural hazards are also allowed 
for in district planning schemes (Second Schedule, clause 
8(a)) and maritime planning schemes (Third Schedule, clause 
8(a)). Both clauses state that these schemes must provide, 
where appropriate, for: 
'The avoidance or reduction of danger, damage 
or nuisance caused by -
(a) Earthquake ... flooding, erosion, landslip, 
subsidence, silting ... ' 
It should be noted that the other matters to be dealt with 
in maritime schemes, as listed in the Third Schedule, are 
not relevant to this study. Clearly, however, all 
appropriate matters listed in that Schedule will be provided 
for when a maritime planning authority prepares scheme. 
Having presented the main statutes relating to coastal 
hazards, and outlined the planning responsibilities of the 
administering agencies, the next section summarises the 
policies of Government and private-sector groups with a duty 
for and/or interest coastal hazard zone management. 
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4.3 POLICIES OF HAZARDS MANAGEMENT AGENCIES 
It is possible to identify two distinct groups of agencies 
hazards directly or indirectly involved in coastal 
management; the first are Government organisations such as 
the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Council, the 
National Water and Soil Cons on Authority, and the 
Earthquake and War Damage Commission. Secondly, there are 
the private-sector organisations, principally the insurance 
industry. 
4.3.1 Government organisations 
Both the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Council 
(SCRCC) and the National Water and Soil Conservation 
Authority (NWASCA) have a responsibility for the 
identification and management of coastal hazard sites. It 
should be noted that the SCRCC is now part of an enlarged 
National Water and Soil Conservation Authority, serviced by 
the Ministry of Works and Development. 
Policies for managing coastal erosion problems were 
announced in November 1971 and reviewed in April 1977 by the 
SCRCC, and by NWASCA in July 1981. The current NWASCA 
policy on coastal hazards closely 
statement. 
follows the 1981 
The SCRCC policy of 
based, was response 
1971, upon which current policy is 
to the statutory responsibility 
the Water and Soil Conservation Act 
and was influenced by a number of 
placed on NWASCA by 
1967, s on l4(3)(e), 
princip s: 
I (a) the existence of many urban coastal communi s 
established before Town and Country Planning 
provided any control or guidance on development, 
and before erosion trends and coastal movements 
had received any study or general understanding; 
(b) the high material value of many urban coastal 
developments; 
(c) the value to the community as a whole of coastal 
recreation areas; 
(d) the relatively low value of rural coastal farmland 
in comparison with the high cost protection 
works; 
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(e) the enormous techni difficulties often 
confronting coastal protection work and the high 
risk of failure; ... ' (Soil Conservation and 
Rivers Control Council. 1977: 1-2). 
Of particular importance, the po cy provided for: 
(i) grant assistance to urban coastal developments 
only where these existed prior to 18 November 1971 
(the date on which the policy was f st issued). 
It was felt that all local territorial authorities 
should by that date have prepared a district 
planning scheme under the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1953, or should have had such a 
scheme under consideration. In addition section 
53 of the Town and Country Planning Amendment Act 
1966 required that district schemes cons 
'Control of development in areas containing ... land 
likely to be affected by ... flooding, erosion, 
landslip and ·subsidence ... ' so that developments 
approved after 18 November 1971 were regarded as 
proceeding in the light of planning controls which 
acknowledged erosion risks; 
(ii) protection of public recreational assets where 
is 'an amenity of recogni public va , . t 
(iii) exclusion of resettlement 
affected by coastal erosion. 
costs for persons 
The policy statement stresses that previously 
subsidized works are not automatically eligible 
for further assistance. Council is free to 
re-assess a subsequent application on its merits 
as a new case; 
(iv) assessment of economic (eg. value of asset at 
sk, cost of proposed works) and non-economic 
(eg. recreational value to the community of the 
asset at sk, the record, where applicable, of 
the local authority in initiating action through 
planning slation to control development in 
potentially hazardous areas) factors; and 
(v) giving catchment authori es and other agencies a 
set of guidelines aimed at reducing future 
problems (eg. investigation of coastal processes, 
consideration of environmental factors). 
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A ew of the policy was conducted in 1977 and it was 
concluded that the policy had and continued to be, 
relevant and effective in managing coastal erosion hazards. 
It was emphasiz however, that each case for grant 
as stance would be assessed on its merits and that grants 
above two-thirds of the total cost for protective works were 
unlikely to be granted. 
Following on from this review, NWASCA re1ea a policy on 
natural hazards and limitations to land use in July 1981. 
It endorsed the technique of coastal hazard zone mapping, as 
described in Gibb (1981(b)), adopted as policy: 
'(i) the general identification of lands subject to 
hazards such as erosion, flooding and 1ands1ip and 
the promotion of the inclusion of such information 
in the relevant Regional Planning Schemes; 
(ii) the promotion of the inclusion in Dist ct 
Planning Schemes of maps and information 
describing the location, type and extent of each 
hazard; and 
(iii) the promotion of the inclusion in Regional and 
District planning schemes of provisions for land 
uses compatible with the type and extent of the 
hazards identified.' (National Water and Soil 
Conservation Organisation, 1982:1). 
Catchment authorities were requested to promote the above 
policy in carrying out their responsibilities and during any 
discussions with regional and local authorities concerning 
the preparation of planning schemes or reviews. 
The current NWASCA policy for coastal erosion and hazard 
planning endorses and consolidates the earlier statements 
outlined above. Emphasis is placed on the prevention of 
damage by coastal erosion through use of appropriate 
planning procedures, 
advice provided by 
taking into account any 
either NWASCA or local 
technical 
catchment 
authori s. It also stresses that the maintenance of any 
propo coastal work must be assured before grant 
assistance will be approved, and that proposals for 
protection works must indicate what steps have been taken to 
control future development in the threatened area. 
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In addition to the SCRCC and NWASCA, the Earthquake and War 
Damage Commission has an interest in hazards management, 
although not specif ly including loss of land by coastal 
erosion. 
Established by the Earthquake and War Damage Act 1944, the 
Commission forms the basis of a national natural hazard 
insurance scheme (O'Riordan, 1971). 
Under section 14 of the Act, any property insured t 
fire is deemed also to be insured for the same amount 
against earthquake and war damage. Insurance companies pay 
an earthquake and war damage premium to the Commission for 
this cover. 
In 1956 the Earthquake and War Damage Regulations 
established an Extraordinary Disaster Fund to be run 
s ly from the Earthquake and War Damage Fund. Ten per 
cent of all premiums paid into the latter Fund by insurance 
companies were transferred to the Disaster Fund. Coverage 
extended to damage caused by storm, flood, or volcanic 
eruption (excluding damage cau by landslip, subsidence of 
earth or rock, or erosion by the sea) (writer's emphasis) if 
it was of an abnormal and un seen nature, and of 
extraordinary effect. It should be noted, however, that new 
Regulations enacted in 1984 delete cover for storm and flood 
damage, so that perils now covered are earthquake, volcanic 
eruption and hydrothermal activity, and landslip. In 
addition the Extraordinary Disaster Fund has been renamed 
the Disaster and Landslip Fund. 
Automatic landslip insurance was introduced from 17 July, 
1970; landslip being defined as: 
'subsidence of a substantial land mass other 
than by settlement, soil shrinkage, or 
compaction; and includes the movement from any 
hill, mound, bank, slope, cliff, or face 
earth or rock, or of a substantial mass 
earth or rock, which before movement formed an 
integral part of the hill, mound, bank, s 
cliff, or face' (Earthquake and War Damage 
Regulations 1984:2). 
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As a result of the Abbotsford landslip in August 1979, a 
Commission of Inquiry was set up, and one of its recommend-
ations was that a review, consolidation and amendment of the 
Act and Regulations was now appropriate. The new 1984 
Regulations have gone some way towards meeting the 
Commission Inquiry's recommendations with the 
introduction of limited land insurance which covers damage 
which is imminent as the rect result of landslip if the 
likely outcome will be total loss of the property concerned. 
Loss of use of land by coastal erosion is, however, still 
not covered by the Act or Regulations de a recommend-
ation by the Abbotsford Landslip Commission of Inquiry to 
the contrary (see Report of the Commission of Inquiry into 
the Abbotsford Landslip Disaster, 1980:160-163). 
4.3.2 Private-sector organisations 
Principally these are insurance companies, although 
appears none of the major companies offer, or anticipate 
of ng, any policies to cover loss of land by coastal 
erosion. This also appears to be the stance adopted by the 
Insurance Council of New Zealand which is the national body 
for the insurance industry (Chung, 1983). 
The recent changes to the Earthquake and War Damage 
Regulations mean that storm and flood cover are now under-
written by the insurance industry so that it seems most of 
the natural hazards experienced in New Zealand are covered 
by either the Earthquake and War Damage Commission or the 
private insurance industry - loss of use of land by coastal 
erosion, however, is a major exception. 
There is no statutory duty for the insurance industry to 
offer any policies covering natural hazards, or to become 
involved in hazards management. However, it is suggested 
here that the industry could playa vital role in coastal 
hazard zone management by investigating and implementing 
policies for loss of use of land by erosion; particularly 
relevant would be study of introducing insurance policies as 
a complementary hazard response to engineering protection 
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works and land use planning practices. To some extent this 
has occurred in the Uni States in regard to flood hazards 
with the enactment and subsequent refinement of the National 
Flood Insurance Program (see for example, Anderson, 1974; 
Miller, 1977; Kusler, 1982: Bragg and Coughl ,1984). It 
is possib that the lessons learned from that experience 
could be relevant and adapted to the management of coastal 
zone haz s in New Zealand. 
4.4 SOME OBSERVATIONS OF THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK 
The five principal statutes relevant to coastal hazards 
management were previously outlined. It is possible to note 
that through time the intent of the legislation appears to 
have moved from one of emphasizing technological responses 
(the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941) to one 
of stressing the complementarity of technological and 
planning responses (the Local Government Act 1974, Town and 
Country Planning Act 1977). 
This shift in emphasis is perhaps a function of better 
knowledge about the interactions and influences of coastal 
processes and coastal land use, as well as a recognition 
that singular responses do not provide satisfactory 
management results. It may also lect changing societal 
attitudes towards the coastal environment - no longer are 
people prepared to see the very asset that attracted them to 
the coast subverted by ugly, and often i ive, 
protective works. 
However, a new set of problems have been posed by this 
change in legisl emphasis; with the sing 
promotion and advocacy of land-use planning controls as a 
means of managing coastal hazard s (for example, use of 
sections 641, 641A Local Government Act 1974) issues such as 
the equity of the planning responses, the restrictions 
p on individual property rights by planning controls, 
and the apparent non-recognition of the problems f by 
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residents who have to live with the imposed controls are 
becoming both clearer and more numerous. 
It seems, then, that the current statutes offer adequate 
controls for limiting future development on hazardous sites 
but are rather weak in considering what can be done for 
managing existing: hazard s s. Possibly this may be 
because it is difficult to influence or change what is 
already physically present, but it does not mean that 
extension of the relevant legislation could not be 
investigated. Possibly this would mean extending the powers, 
duties and functions of administering agencies to icitly 
provide for the management of existing hazard sites. 
without slative direction and guidance there is no 
statutory obligation (or indeed the finance or s f) for 
admini ng bodies to develop policies or implement 
to natural 
fighting1 
long-term 
management approaches. 
hazards then merely 
efforts rather than 
Management responses 
become sjointed 1fire 
as part of any overall 
strategYi for many communities on the New Zealand coast that 
are currently experiencing erosion problems, this suggestion 
appears to hold true. 
This introduces the second aspect dealt with in this chapter 
the administrators of legislation, and relevant interest 
groups. 
Government agencies exist primarily to 
functions and duties as outlined by 
carry out their 
slation. Clearly 
then, the problems and omissions inherent in legislation are 
likely to be translated into the policies of administering 
agencies. Any particular interpretation of their statutory 
responsibilities will possibly be reflected in an agency 1s 
policies depending on factors such as perception of the 
problem, awareness of alternative management responses, and 
the degree 
strategies 
Efforts in 
development 
of emphasis placed on developing long-term 
as opposed to short-term containing actions. 
formulating appropriate controls for future 
are eminently useful but until the same effort 
goes into studying 
developments only part 
issues and options for existing 
the problem is being addressed. 
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The exclusion of cover by the Earthquake and War Damage 
Commission and the insurance industry for loss of use of 
land by coastal erosion raises the ques on: What makes the 
coastal hazard so different to other natural hazards? 
Possibly the degree of fore may be one 
consideration. Coastal erosion, whether it is at the almost 
imperceptible rate of millimetres per year or the dramatic 
metres per hour during storms, may be considered quite 
predictable. In contrast, it is almost impossible to 
predict when and where an 
degree of foreseeability, then, has 
will strike. This 
implications for any 
insuring agency since it is likely to have to pay for claims 
sooner or later. It is pos 
use of land caused by coa 
that payouts will be sooner 
that in the case of loss of 
erosion the insurers believe 
than later. 
In addition, they may be eve that the 'target population' 
is too small to warrant introducing policies. Since any 
claims are likely to be high if severe damages occurred, the 
money received from premiums may not cover all the losses. 
For the insurance industry this consideration is 
significant. The implementation and administration of any 
insurance scheme also been suggested as barriers to 
introducing any policy, particularly the rate of the 
premiums to be charged, and in the case of any scheme 
administered by the War Damage Commission the equity of such 
a proposal. However these do not seem insurmountable 
problems as witnessed by the American experience with a 
government-subsidized flood insurance programme. The 
of insurance as an input to coastal hazards management wi 
be further discussed in later chapters. 
From 
polic 
ewing the relevant 
it is suggested 
hazards legislation 
that. there already 
and 
to 
exist opportunity for implementing multiple adjustments to a 
coa erosion hazard. For instance, the provisions the 
Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941, the Local 
Government Act 1974, and the Town and Country Planning Act 
1977 when looked at in combination seem to provide statutory 
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scope for enacting both techn 1 and planning responses to 
a particular hazard. The poli es of the administering 
agencies therefore are given a wide discretion in 
interpreting and implementing this capacity, although it 
appears that they are not utili ng this opportunity to the 
1. Instead the administering agencies are focussing 
their policies on providing singular hazards responses. In 
turn this mutually exclusive management approach has raised 
a number of significant issues and imp cations, as 
evidenced by the findings of the case-study of Wainui Beach, 
Gisborne. 
In addition, it is suggested that the legal and 
institutional framework for coastal haza s management in 
New Zealand encompasses most of the theoretical range of 
adjustments to erosion, as outlined in Chapter Two. The 
opportunity to utilise both technical and planning 
responses, through statutory and policy measures, means that 
hazards adjustments could include a combination of modifying 
the hazard (by for example, protective works), and modifying 
the loss potential (through say, zoning controls in planning 
schemes). These types of adjustments may also a the 
human-use system in the hazardous area so that vulnerability 
to a hazard is reduced. 
Thus, the only type of adjustment not covered by the present 
legal and institutional set-up for coastal hazards is that 
of adapting to the loss. Such an adjustment involves 
consideration of the role of insurance, and relief and 
rehabilitation schemes. This type of adjustment places more 
emphasis on post-hazard impacts and the provision of 
adequate measures to help cope with the burden of loss. 
The opportunity sts, then, to examine 
adjustment as a possible management 
complement other hazards responses adopted. 
this type 
alternative 
Before this 
of 
to 
is 
done, however, it is relevant to draw together the main 
issues that have emerged from the preceding chapters to 
provide an outline of the problems and implications raised 
by the current emphasis on singular types of management 
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approaches. From this it then becomes possible to consider 
alternative approaches that will assist in overcoming the 
identified problems. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
COASTAL HAZARD ZONE MANAGEMENT : IDENTIFYING THE ISSUES 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Present management responses towards coastal hazards raise a 
number important issues encompassing the physical, social 
and economic dimensions. The case-study of Wainui Beach, 
Gisborne highlighted a number of conflicts and implications 
posed by the adopted management approaches. Similarly, the 
review of the legal and ins tutional aspects of coastal 
hazards management pointed to some important considerations 
that require examination. 
This chapter draws together the significant issues raised by 
the preceding chapters. In particular there are four main 
issues identified within which are a number of related 
questions, problems, and propositions that can be sed. 
The four major issues discussed are: 
(i) the range of management responses considered by 
decision-makers; 
(ii) the types of techniques used to define hazard 
zones; 
(iii) the implementation and administration of hazard 
zones; and 
(iv) the implications of hazards responses for 
residents. 
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The common theme through all of these is that the current 
management responses do not represent the total range of 
potential hazards adjustments. This raises the que on: Is 
it possible to develop alternative management responses that 
address these issues and provide a wider range of adjust-
ments for decision-makers to consider? 
It would not be realistic to formulate a complete range of 
potential adjustments. However, it is realistic to propose 
various options that provide contributions towards 
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developing more comprehensive hazards management approaches 
and particularly approaches that recognise the issues facing 
existing coastal hazard sites. Providing adjustments that 
allow adaptation to losses, through insurance, is one such 
option. The last two chapters of this study develop this 
proposition as an alternative management approach that 
promotes multiple adjustments to coastal hazards. 
5.2 IDENTIFYING THE ISSUES 
5.2.1 The range of management responses considered by 
decision-makers 
Response to natural hazards is related to two main factors: 
perception of the hazard, and an awareness of opportunities 
to make adjustments. For most coastal hazards, perception 
is not a major problem: the effects of the hazards, whether 
delayed or dramatic, are apparent. The second factor 
governing response is not so clear-cut, however. 
In New Zealand, as elsewhere, the traditional response to 
coastal hazards has been to rely solely on engineering 
works. This is evidenced in the number of structures such 
as seawalls, groynes and revetments constructed along many 
beaches. In some circumstances the technical response has 
been appropriate and has helped alleviate the situation. In 
other circumstances, however, this type of response has been 
expensive financially and environmentally (often 
irreversibly so). 
Recently there has been a shift away from emphasising purely 
technical responses towards social responses based on land-
use management, and specifically planning controls. However 
similar problems can be identified with the singular 
reliance on planning measures, except that the impacts are 
directed more towards the human resource (people), rather 
than on the physical resource (the coastal environment). 
These observations give rise to the question: Is it more 
useful to propose management approaches that integrate both 
technical and social adjustments? 
either type of adjustment is 
possibly more instances where 
There are 
suitable, but 
a mixture of 
73 
cases where 
there are 
both is 
appropriate. Such an approach widens the range of 
adjustments that can be developed and presented to decision-
makers. This i~ significant since a narrow range of 
alternatives, whether technical or social, limits the types 
of management responses that can be investigated and 
implemented; effectively this promotes management within a 
'tunnel vision' setting. Decision-makers in this situation 
may in fact exacerbate the problem if an adopted management 
strategy consequently raises unanticipated social, physical 
and economic implications. 
For example, a decision to build a groyne out from a beach 
may lower beach aesthetics, will probably induce further 
groyne construction along the beach in an attempt to build 
up beach levels (since groynes trap sand moving alongshore) 
which in turn reduces beach aesthetics further, and will 
definitely require maintenance costs. 
An integrated approach utilising both technical and social 
adjustments also acknowledges that it is just as important 
to consider what goes on top of the land as it is to 
consider what factors influence the land's foundations. 
Thus, it is important to recognise that there is a relation 
between above- and below-ground factors and that there are 
other land-uses apart from buildings that may contribute to 
the hazard. The site may become unstable if one of these 
factors is placed under undue stress by, for example 
'landscaping' through foredune levelling, or restricted 
drainage by compaction of soil. 
The use of both types of adjustments in combination 
therefore provides for a broader approach towards managing a 
hazard through its emphasis on treating the natural and 
human-use systems as a total entity rather than as two 
disjointed elements. From this it follows that if the land 
is protected then any buildings on it are also protected, 
and not vice-versa. 
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5.2.2 The types of techniques used to define hazard zones 
There are a variety of techniques available for identifying 
the nature and extent of hazard-prone areas, such as buffer 
zoning (Kirk, 1979(a)), set-back limits (Healy, 1980, 1981), 
and coastal hazard zone mapping (Gibb, 1981(a), 1981(b)). 
For all of the techniques a number of questions can be posed 
concerning their use as inputs towards hazard zone 
management. 
First, how long is the historical record that is available 
for the site? For most parts of the New Zealand coast the 
historical record is relatively short and frequently there 
are considerable gaps between recordings. Kirk (1982) has 
pointed to some of the difficulties posed by this short 
information base: problems in making various data sources 
such as old maps, deposited survey plans and air photos 
strictly comparable and the errors which arise in the 
measurements; and the clustering of the available historical 
data from the 1930's onwards. As he notes, not only is the 
record short but it is also concentrated in the I'near" end 
of our history. This situation forces coastal resource 
managers into making the most of the available information, 
prompting discretion and conservatism in any hazard zone 
delineation and associated planning controls. 
Secondly, from an acknowledgement of the short historical 
record, a further question concerns the representativeness 
of that record for describing present and future situations, 
in other words, how good a descriptor is the record? This 
recognises the fact that there are often long time periods 
when recordings for s (whether personal observation, air 
photo analysis, or wind and wave data) are unavailable. For 
example, at Wainui Beach, Gisborne five air photos taken 
over a 39 year period from 1942 to 1981 were u as a major 
input towards defining the hazard .zone. A number of points 
can be made from this: 
(i) five air photos only allows four inter-comparisons 
to be made, which is barely adequate or accurate 
as a descriptor of past and future shoreline 
states; 
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(ii) the historical record is very short; and 
(iii) the time intervals between each photo run were 
unequal so it is difficult to estimate a net trend 
of shoreline change over the length of the 
historical record. 
This last point has been recognised by Kirk (1982) who cites 
McLean (1978) as noting that in order to distinguish a 
realistic net trend (direction) of shoreline change it would 
be preferable to have a minimum of ten equi-spaced time 
periods for comparison (at decade intervals) over the total 
length of the historical record. Generally, however, this 
situation will not occur as illustrated by the Wainui Beach 
example. 
This leads on to the third question concerning the accuracy 
of extrapolating past trends into the future to predict 
rates of shoreline change. Kirk (1982:14-17) has 
illustrated the difficulty in identifying shoreline trends, 
particularly the problem of distinguishing short-term 
fluctuations from longer-term sequences of erosion or 
accretion. 
This has implications for 
diagnosis of shoreline 
management since an incorrect 
trends may result in inappropriate 
strategies being proposed or worse, implemented. It also 
raises for consideration the appropriateness of some of the 
existing management responses. The technique of coastal 
hazard zone mapping (Gibb, 1981(a), 1981(b)) has been 
accepted by the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Council 
(now part of NWASCA) as being applicable nationwide. Gibb 
(1981(b):29) notes that the criteria for assessing the width 
of a hazard zone will differ from site to site, but factors 
to be considered include, inter alia,: 
(i) long-term (about 100 years) erosion or accretion 
rate; 
(ii) short-term (a few tens of years) fluctuations in 
the position of the shoreline; and 
(iii) the likelihood of a reversal from net shoreline 
advance to net retreat in the future. 
76 
All of these factors would be difficult to unambiguously 
determine considering the problems of distinguishing the 
'noise' of short-term changes from longer-term trends of 
erosion or accretion, and the third factor is probably 
speculative (Kirk, 1982). 
Bearing in mind the limitations of the available historical 
data (the short record, and the representativeness of that 
record) the delineation of hazard zones using this technique 
raises two further points: 
(i) how well does the information describ~ past 
trends?; and 
(ii) how well does it represent the likely situation in 
the future? 
Both of these points are significant since a hazard zone 
defined by this technique is shown as a "100 year predicted 
line" on district planning schemes, with associated planning 
controls being imposed. As Gibb (198l(b):29) notes: 
I ••• the landward extent of the hazard zone 
represents the line beyond which the shore 
line (seaward limit of land vegetation) is not 
expected to lie ... Any development placed 
within the hazard zone during the next 100 
years may be destroyed by coastal erosion. I 
Having regard to the earlier discus on 
of the data-base available for most 
the short-comings 
of the New Zealand 
coast, it is difficult to confidently place bounds on the 
width of a hazard zone from extrapolation of past trends and 
certainly not for a period 100 years hence. 
The final question concerns the degree of confidence that 
can be placed on the available information sources for 
planning purposes. The usefulness of specifying time 
periods in 
contentious. 
delineating hazard zones is particularly 
It has been noted earlier that there is a 
meagre historical record to use as a guide when looking to 
the future, an~ this severely limits the confidence that can 
be placed on extrapolating too far forwards. Additionally, 
there may be legal implications in proposing a time period, 
particularly a period such as 100 years, since planning 
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periods are commonly 15 years and district schemes are meant 
to be reviewed every 5 years (Kirk, 1982). Also, regional 
planning schemes are required to be reviewed after 10 years. 
Coasts are subject to a variety of hazards, not just 
erosion. Any techniques that seek to identify hazard zones 
need to account for this, and incorporate a wide range of 
factors when calculating the width of the zone. Information 
on the sk of seawater inundation, the height, bulk, and 
conformation of dunes, the effect of sea level change, an 
assessment of the overall sediment budget, and the effects 
of tectonic uplift will be appropriate considerations for 
particular sites - rarely is the measurement of erosion 
degree adequate for defining hazard zone widths. 
Buffer zoning, set-back limits, coastal hazard zone mapping 
and other hazards identification techniques incorporate the 
above considerations to a greater or lesser extent in their 
calculations. It is conceivable that for a given situation, 
a different hazard zone may be delineated depending on the 
type of technique used, and interpretation made of the 
information base (see for example, Kirk, 1982). For 
planning purposes this may pose an interesting problem for a 
local authority or planning tribunal, because, depending on 
the technique used and the interpretation made of the 
information sources, completely different hazard zone widths 
may be proposed. Assuming that due care and discretion have 
been exercised in defining the zone width, a planning or 
judicial body may find its f having to decide which 
technique, or perhaps combination of techniques, best 
defines the extent of the hazard zone. To date planning 
tribunals have not had to deal with this dilemma but is 
realistic to expect them to have to face such a situation in 
future as more coa~tal communities have hazard zones 
delineated by one 'expert', and subsequently challenged by 
affected residents engaging another 'expert' who may define 
the hazard zone differently. It should also be noted that 
none of the techniques available have any legal force by 
themselves; the planning tribunals appear to have accepted 
the proposed hazard zones on the basis that they were 
defined using adequate discretion and according to 
interpretations of relevant information. 
although there has not been a court case where a 
zone defined by one method has been challenged 
78 
logical 
Again, 
hazard 
by a 
different interpretation using another method it is bound to 
happen in future. 
Finally, it is significant that none of the techniques 
presently used as management responses provide much positive 
assistance to existinq coastal communities facing a hazard. 
Like much of the legislation relating to natural hazards, 
each of the techniques emphasizes limiting future 
development on inappropriate sites. To be fair none of the 
techniques claim to address s issue. However, appears 
that such an omission is serious given the number of coastal 
communities presently and potentially threatened, value 
of assets at risk, and the current 'management' approach of 
merely drawing lines on maps and designating the area within 
as a hazard zone, leaving the local authority and affected 
residents to cope as best they can. 
5.2.3 The implementation and administration of hazard zones 
Local authorities who must manage coastal hazard sites are 
increasingly accepting and endorsing, in part or in 
hazard zones defined by the various techniques. Appropr 
planning controls are specified in district schemes to 
reflect the nature and extent of the threat and to reduce 
the number and value of human and physical assets at ri 
However, se local authorities are treading a tight-rope: 
on the one hand they have a statutory planning duty to avoid 
or minimise the effects of erosion, subsidence, 
inundation but on the other hand they have to recognise and 
provide for property rights of land owners. Planning 
controls for hazard sites may infringe upon those rights to 
a greater or sser extent dep~nding on the width of the 
hazard zone adopted and the manner in which the council 
administers the zone. 
This balancing act is compounded by the fact that local 
authorities are mindful of possible claims for negligence if 
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they issue building permits and subsequent damage occurs. 
Although section 641A of the Local Government Act 1974 
appears to exonerate councils from this possibility, it 
seems most are not tempting fate and are choosing to 
administer the hazard zones quite strictly when building 
permit applications are submitted. 
The role expert advice to councils is another important 
point. Ultimately planning isions have to be made by the 
full council, but they are dependent on the advice given to 
them by their staff at officer level (such as planners, 
engineers, building inspectors) and any consultants they may 
engage. It is possible that a limited range of 'feasible' 
management approaches will be presented to the council so 
that decisions are made with a degree of 'tunnel vision'. 
This represents management on a very convenient basis since 
the council may select its preferred approach from those 
presented and feel that it has fulfilled its statutory 
planning duties, and at the same time believe that they do 
not need to initiate further investigation of alternative 
management approaches. Thus, the awareness of alternative 
adjustments may be confined to a narrow range; a range that 
could overlook justments more appropriate to managing the 
hazard. 
Expert advice, whether from local authority staff or 
consultants, raises other considerations. Total rejection 
of expert advice could place a council in a vulnerable 
posi on if a claim for negligence is made at a later date 
since the council had been supplied with relevant 
information and had been made aware of the situation. 
Conversely, total acceptance of expert advice does not 
absolve a council from such claims either. Two situations 
make this view tenable: 
(i) having endorsed the expert advice and established 
a hazard zone, a severe event removes more land 
than del by the zone; and 
(ii) having endorsed the expert advice and established 
a hazard zone, erosion does not occur to the 
extent predicted. However, during this time 
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people have been denied used of their land through 
the strict planning controls imposed. 
Having regard to these points, it is clear that councils 
should act with extreme caution when deciding on the type of 
hazards management response to be implemented. 
In administering hazard zones sections 641 and 641A of the 
Local Government Act 1974 seem to offer some positive guides 
to councils in resolving the dilemma of meeting statutory 
duties as well as providing for individual property rights. 
This proposition poses some questions, however. 
rst, does use of section 641A allow councils to 'get their 
cake and eat it too'? This section provides councils with a 
scretionary power to issue building permits for 
relocatable buildings and appears to protect them from any 
subsequent liability claims. This implies that a council 
can gain rates from any new buildings constructed or 
additions, alterations that have been made, whilst meeting 
its statutory planning obligations, and providing for the 
individual rights of property owners all at the same time. 
The problems of who will move the relocatable buildings and 
to where during a storm or flood, and how this will be done 
are matters few councils appear to have considered. 
Second, does approval of applications made under sections 
641 and 641A release a council from any further need to 
invest alternative means of managing the hazard? It 
appears that these two sections provide for the short- to 
medium-term use of land but do not p any onus on 
councils to study other types of responses or develop long-
term management approaches. Adjustments to the hazard may 
be confined to a narrow set of alternatives that treat the 
symptoms of the problem without offering any suggestions for 
its resolution. This may be a c.onvenient approach towards 
management but means that responses are no more than 
containing actions rather than part of any overall plan. 
81 
This raises the question of the adequacy of the 
hazards slation and administrative framework. 
existing 
No effort 
is being 
approaches, 
made to 
whether 
co-ordinate 
it is 
the 
use 
various 
of the 
management 
hazard zone 
identification 
legis or 
strategy that 
techniques, planning controls, the 
protective works into a coherent overall 
considers both the control of future 
inappropriate development and management of existing 
hazard sites. Management efforts are therefore isolated, 
disjointed and look to the short- to medium-term: 
effectively 'fire-fighting' responses. There is a need to 
promote strategies that provide long-term guidance, address 
the issue of existing hazard problems, and encourage a wider 
awareness of alternative management approaches that 
decision- makers can cons 
A final point to consider is how useful are the current 
hazards responses for residents living inside designated 
hazard zones? The proposition is that the management 
approaches currently used are no more than a sophis cated 
'do nothing' option these people. None of the 
techniques used for defining hazard zones, legislation, or 
planning controls appear to address the particular needs of 
fected residents and none offer any positive assistance in 
preparing for the impact of severe events. It is 
unfortunate that present emphasis on drawing lines on 
maps around hazard sites and calling these hazard zones is 
the extent of the management effort. Not only is this 
effort of little practical assistance for affected residents 
within the hazard zone, but it also c ly illustrates the 
narrow range of adjustments considered by decision-makers, 
planners and resource managers. 
There are several reasons why it is urgent that this range 
be broadened. The first is that the number of existing 
sites threatened by coastal hazards probably increased 
from the 90 identified by the Ministry of Works and 
Development in 1977; associated with this is the value 
the assets threatened, both public and private. A third 
reason why the range needs to be widened concerns the moral 
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question: Does society walk away from these people and their 
needs believing that they should cope as best they can 
without any recourse to the taxpayer, Government or other 
groups for disaster aid? 
5.2.4 The implications of current hazards strategies for 
residents 
Principally the issues are: 
(i) the costs and benefits of the strategy; 
(ii) the usefulness of 
(iii) the restricted 
considered. 
ining hazard zones; and 
range of management approaches 
The benef and costs of occupying a hazardous area are 
numerous. Baker (1976) notes that among the benefits are 
aesthetic or emotional attractiveness of the site, 
particularly to residential users, while the costs include 
loss of life, physical damage to property and buildings, 
physchological trauma, and environmental degradation when 
severe events occur. However, he emphasizes that these are 
only the primary costs; secondary costs result from the 
diversion of resources (financial, disaster aid by 
volunteers) from their primary goal because of the onset of 
a disaster. To date these secondary costs have been 
difficult to quantify. 
In estimating the fects a land use management policy may 
have, several points require consideration: 
(i) loss aversion; 
(ii) environmental effects; 
(iii) other secondary effects; 
(iv) administrative costs; 
(v) foregone benefits of hazard zone use; and 
(vi) public acceptance (Baker, 1976). 
Probably the most significant consideration in evaluating 
hazard zone management alternatives is the effect the 
strategy will have on losses from severe events (Baker, 
1976; McDonald, 1980). The primary benefits from a land use 
management approach are reductions in losses, but such an 
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approach has little effect on protecting people and assets 
currently at risk. Rather they control the amount of future 
risk-exposed development (Baker, 1976). 
In addition to averting losses, land use management can 
reduce environmental degradation by controlling the nature 
and types activities and uses within the area. 
Environmental effects are just one aspect of what may be 
called the secondary effects of the adjustment. These are 
effects which are generated by the adjustment but were 
secondary to the motivation hazard loss management; 
examples include diversion of economic growth and population 
redistribution (Baker, 1976). 
Restrictive land use strategies a involve costs of 
implementing and administering the strategy. Principally 
this falls on the local authority who must not only define 
the area to be managed but also enact and enforce the 
relevant policy and ordinances of their district scheme. 
For most land use alternatives the largest cost is the 
opportunity cost of not using the land for its most 
productive use, or expressed another way the use which 
maximises economic rent (Barlowe, 1972 
Some land uses are more profitable, 
in Baker, 1976). 
giving a greater 
economic return, than others and if the 'higher' uses are 
precluded then the benefits foregone can be considered 
opportunity costs of restricted development (Baker, 1976). 
The argument is that if an activity sought to locate in the 
hazard zone initially, it was because the site offered 
something more than it could get outside the area. Thus, if 
the activity is forced to locate at the next best location 
(outside the hazard zone) because of land use regulations, 
then the difference in profits to the activity from its 
location outs the area and what they would have been 
within the area must be considered a cost of the regulation 
(Baker, 1976). Against this, however, must be weighed the 
benefits of the aversion, and reduction of environmental 
degradation. Some researchers have attempted to estimate 
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opportunity costs associated with land use management nd, 
1976; James, 1972) but accurate measurement of such costs 
are difficult to obtain. 
Public acceptance of any management approach is important. 
Depending on the type of approach adopted and the manner in 
which it is implemented and administered, pub c acceptance 
or disapproval may be counted as either a benefit or cost. 
It would be difficult to quantify such reactions since it is 
most likely to be reflected by people's tudes and 
behaviour towards the local authority, so that a subjective 
assessment will be required. 
It has been noted that land use management has little effect 
on protecting people and assets currently at risk. This 
poses the question: Are zoning controls a zero-cost (do 
nothing) option? 
Zoning in itself only res cts land uses, controls 
subdivision development, and buildings. Thus, most of the 
hazards management approaches that emphasize planning 
controls are not offering any suggestions about 
understanding the cause of the hazard, developing 
alternative management approaches, or what types of 
adjustments are relevant for existing hazard sites. 
Effectively, land use management places these sites in a 
'freeze' situation since the planning controls restrict 
(often severely) what activities and uses are permitted, 
whilst little attempt is made to investigate adjustments 
that offer practical ief should a severe event occur. 
Considering that people within existing coastal hazard sites 
are not eligible for insurance cover for loss of use of land 
from either the insurance industry or the Earthquake and War 
Damage Commission, and are unlikely to receive compensation 
or be relocated by the local authority, the current 
management approach of defining hazard zones on maps and 
imposing planning controls appears to support the zero-cost 
option. 
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This promotes the suggestion that it would be timely to 
initiate study of a wider range of hazard adjustments apart 
from engineering works and land use management. Response to 
hazards is governed by two factors, one of which is an 
awareness of opportuni es to make adjustments. 
Alternative adjustments that deserve investigation are those 
that allow adaptation to losses (for example, by the 
availability of insurance), and adjustments that modify loss 
potential (such as funds for purchase of endangered 
property) (see Table II). Development of a wider range of 
strategies is advocated for a number of reasons. First, the 
problems raised by on purely engineering 
'solutions' such as cost effectiveness, environmental 
degradation, unanticipated s ef appear also to be 
occurring with the current emphasis on land use management 
(see for example, Withy and Henderson, 1982). Second, the 
above two approaches are unneces ly restricting the 
choice of management approaches that decision-makers can 
select from so that the adopted response may not be the most 
appropriate; and third, given the number of present and 
potential coastal hazard sites and the value of assets at 
risk it is critical that a long-term, integrated hazard 
management approach be promoted; one that not only seeks to 
limit future development on inappropriate sites but also 
provides positive assistance for res 
already threatened by coastal hazards. 
Thus, it is suggested that it is 
urgent, to develop strategies that 
i 
are 
time and which also increase the range of 
sion-makers can consider. 
5.3 SUMMARY 
and communities 
and perhaps 
applicable through 
adjustments that 
This chapter has drawn together all the issues sed in the 
preceding chapters and examined them under four categories. 
These were identified as: 
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(i) the range of management responses considered by 
decision-makers; 
(ii) the types of techniques used to define hazard 
zones; 
(iii) the implementation and administration of hazard 
zones; and 
(iv) the implications of hazards responses for affected 
residents. 
Each category prompted a number of related questions, 
problems and propositions which were 
dominant theme to emerge was that 
responses do not represent the full 
hazards adjustments. Although it 
formulate an exhaustive range, it is 
scussed, but the 
current management 
range of potential 
is unrealistic to 
possible to provide 
contributions that broaden the types of approaches decision-
makers can cons and therefore increase the 
opportunities for providing management responses appropriate 
and relevant to the hazard. This is a signi cant point 
because response to hazards is governed by two main factors; 
first, perception of the hazard, and second, an awareness of 
opportunities to make adjustments. Increasing that 
awareness, therefore, increases the poss lity of 
developing an appropriate management approach. 
Both the case-study of Wainui Beach and the review of the 
legal and ins tutional framework for coastal hazards 
management highlighted the problems posed by the present 
emphasis on mutually exclusive types of hazards responses. 
It was suggested that there would be merit considering, 
and indeed there already appears statutory provision for, a 
wider range of management approaches that could provide 
positive assistance and assurance to existing and future 
coastal communities threatened by an erosion hazard. In 
addition, such alternatives should be complementary to other 
types of hazards responses. Thus, it would then be possible 
to propose a more comprehensive approach to hazard zone 
management that is relevant through time and across a number 
of theoretical adjustments. 
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Insurance offers one such alternative. The following 
chapter examines the role insurance could playas part of a 
management approach that promotes multiple adjustments to a 
hazard. Such a proposition offers the opportunity to 
resolve many of the issues and conflicts discussed in this 
chapter. 
CHAPTER SIX 
TOWARDS COMPREHENSIVE HAZARDS MANAGEMENT : THE ROLE OF 
INSURANCE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
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The 'identification of the issues raised by current hazard 
zone management approaches is only one aspect of a multi 
faceted inquiry. Another aspect concerns the question of 
framing approaches that contribute towards resolving those 
issues whilst at the same time increasing the range of 
hazard adjustments for decision-makers to consider. 
In response to this proposition, this chapter outlines the 
role insurance may playas an alternative hazards management 
approach. 
seen as 
It is emphasized, however, that insurance is not 
the definitive management approach. Rather, 
insurance is viewed as one of many possible hazards 
adjustments, and as a complement to both the engineering and 
planning responses. 
6.2 INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 
Insurance schemes are a formal method of spreading sk and 
basically have two fundamental characteristics: 
(i) transferring or shifting risk from one individual 
to a group; and 
(ii) sharing losses, by some means, among all members 
of the group (Vaughan and Elliot, 1978). 
Hellberg (1984) contends that insurance can only cater for 
risks when the following features ,are present: 
(i) there must be a sufficient number of risks of a 
similar class being insured so as to produce an 
average of loss experience; 
(ii) it must be possible to calculate the chance of 
loss; 
89 
(i 
(iv) 
occurrence of loss must be fortuitous; 
must be an insurable interest to protect; 
and 
(v) the possible loss must not be catastrophic. 
He notes further that it is possible by the law of large 
numbers or the law of averages to calculate what are the 
chances of an event or events happening and the amount that 
will be required to provide the common fund or pool to which 
the many contribute, and out of which those who suffer 
losses are compensated. However, he believes that there are 
some instances where insurance can not be provided, such as 
for landslip or erosion since 
be fortuitous. 
occurrence of loss may not 
This raises a matter of social policy, since it must be 
decided whether consideration must be given to the provision 
of compensation or indemnity for the victims of uninsurable 
events (Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Abbotsford Landslip Disaster, 1980). 
In considering whether it is desi in princip that a 
comprehensive disaster insurance scheme should be 
established or extended, consideration must be given to 
several questions of policy and princip First, it is 
necessary to decide whether what is envisaged is an 
insurance scheme, basically sharing the risk, or whether 
what is proposed is a form of social insurance, partly or 
fully charged upon the whole community, to cover some forms 
of material damage to real and personal property. Many 
implications will follow from this basic decision. If what 
is contemplated is a form of true insurance, then it is 
pos ble to extend the insurance scheme on to existing 
contracts provided that the scheme is based on economically 
viable premium rates and provided that there is a realistic 
connect between premium and risk, taking into account 
that if such insurance is voluntary, then the nature and 
extent of the premium pool necessary to meet claims must 
determine the premium amount (Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry into the Abbotsford Landslip Disaster, 1980). 
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However, if what is really envisaged is the assumption by 
the State of what would normally be an individual risk, and 
financial compensation for that risk (that is, a system of 
social insurance to compensate for material damage to 
property), then, subject to ordinary considerations of 
equity, it is appropriate that cover be extended on the 
basis of some universally applicable payment, most probably 
in the form of a tax. It may be possible though to propose 
a scheme which is a compromise between both extremes (Report 
of the Commission of Inquiry into the Abbotsford Landslip 
Disaster, 1980). 
Any form of disaster insurance, or compensation scheme which 
is of an insurance nature rather than simply a government 
funded compensation scheme, should consider a number of 
conditions if equitable cover is to be provided. These 
conditions include: 
(i) there must be a demand for the coverage, so that 
sufficient premium income on a large number of 
risks can bear the cost of individual claims; 
(ii) there must be a spread of risks, by nature and 
location, so that no single event can cause a loss 
of such magnitude that it would eliminate the 
premium pool and its reserves; 
(iii) the events covered must not be influenced or be 
capable of being influenced by deliberate actions 
on the part of the insured; 
(iv) the frequency and magnitude of losses must be 
assessable; 
(v) the circumstances of the occurrence must be 
capable of definition; 
(vi) the amount of premium must be acceptable to the 
insured from the point of view of his capacity to 
pay; and 
(vii) statistical data covering a sufficiently long 
period and over a sufficiently wide base should be 
available, if at all possible (Lester, 1980). 
It would appear that insurance for some natural hazards, 
including loss of use of land caused by coastal erosion, has 
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to date been discounted as a possible management approach 
because of the possibility of catastrophic loss (Butler and 
Doessel, 1983). Kunreuther et al., 
cite factors such as: 
(l978(a):244245) also 
(i) adverse selection, s the demand for coverage 
is concentrated in relatively few areas; 
(ii) moral hazard, that is the difficulty insurance 
companies have in distinguishing between avoidable 
and unavoidable risks when drawing up 
insurance contracts; 
their 
(iii) the transaction costs incurred in developing 
customised premiums reflecting the situation faced 
by the individual property owner; and 
(iv) problem of externalities, or the effect that 
the location of structures in one area has on 
damage to other areas. 
These are seen as major difficulties to the insurance 
industry marketing hazards insurance. 
These factors, according to Kunreuther et al., (1978(a», 
explain why the economic system has not developed a more 
satisfactory set of markets for risk-bearing and insurance 
(see also, Marshall, 1974). This view was shared by Arrow 
(1963:947 in Kunreuther et al., 1978(a):246) who noted: 
'when the market Is to achieve an optimal 
state, society will, to some extent at least, 
recognise the gap, and nonmarket social 
institutions will arise attempting to bridge 
it. ' 
The National Flood Insurance Programme enacted in the United 
States in 1968 is an excellent example of how social 
ins tutions have developed to overcome the sources of 
market failure (Kunreuther et al., 1978(a». These authors 
noted that since the federal government [central government] 
subs zed rates, people were able to buy coverage at 
reasonable prices. In addition the subsidized rates 
eliminated the high transaction costs that would otherwise 
be required in setting customised rates for existing 
structures on floodplains. Rates on new property lect 
the degree of flood sk; the property owner bears the cost 
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of determining the appropriate elevation of the house and 
this then forms the basis of his premium. A government 
reinsurance programme protected any participating insurance 
companies against catastrophic losses caused by the problem 
of adverse selection, and the orcement of land-use 
regulations and building codes reduced the externalities 
associated with upstream development. 
It was found, however, that although subsidized flood 
insurance was readily available, few individuals purchased 
coverage on a voluntary basis. In response, the Flood 
Disaster Protection Act was passed in 1973. This increased 
the incentives for flood-prone communities to participate in 
the programme and for residents of those areas to purchase 
flood insurance. An identified flood-prone community has 
the choice of participating in the programme or forf ting 
federally subsidized flood insurance and all but emergency 
forms of as stance in t~e areas subject to severe flooding. 
In essence, the programme is now designed as a compulsory 
insurance scheme for flood plain management (Kunreuther et 
al.,1978(a». 
This last point is significant as it has been found that 
voluntary participation in a hazards insurance scheme is 
minimal, even if it is heavily subsidized (see Kunreuther, 
1973; Bernstein, 1973 in Kunreuther et al., 1978(a». The 
latter has stated that 
'most property owners do not buy insurance 
voluntarily, regardless of the amount of 
equity they have at stake ... People do not buy 
insurance voluntarily unless there is pressure 
on them from one source or another' 
(Bernstein, 1973 in Kunreuther et al., 
1978(a): 248). 
From the preceding discussion, then, there is support for 
the view contained in the Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry into the Abbotsford Landslip Disaster (1980) that a 
national disaster insurance fund can only work if it is: 
(i) compulsory and based on a properly calculated 
premium; or 
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(ii) heavily subsidized by the government; and 
(iii) fully underwritten by the government as a virtual 
reinsurer of last resort. 
It would appear that an insurance scheme for natural hazards 
is vi and indeed already exists for some hazards as 
evidenced by the cover offered by the Earthquake and War 
Damage Commission. 
There is also a useful model provided by the American Flood 
Insurance Programme which could be examined for its 
usefulness and applicability to New Zealand, particularly 
for the hazard of loss of use of land caused by coastal 
erosion since this is presently not covered by ei the 
insurance industry or the Earthquake and War Damage 
Commission. 
6.3 INSURANCE AND COASTAL HAZARD ZONE MANAGEMENT 
A fundamental question that requires attention is: Why 
should there by any insurance provided for communities 
located on hazardous coa 1 sites? 
There are a variety disciplines within which it would be 
possible to seek arguments for and against insurance for a 
natural hazard. C morals and ethics play a part since 
a philosophical base is implied in the question; economics, 
too, is another important element s 
involve cost-benefit analysis, welfare 
is possible to 
economics, and 
economic philosophies spanning the spectrum from the free 
market at one extreme to the welfare state at the other with 
combinations of both between these extremes. Physchological 
considerations concerning uncertainty and reactions to 
stress are also gnificant aspects. 
It is not propo to examine these various disciplines in 
further detail, although this is not to denigrate the 
contribution they can make towards any hazards study_ 
Rather, the diversity of specia s fields that could 
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provide relevant considerations indicates the complexity of 
the question posed. It also suggests that ultimately the 
answer to the question must be founded on the philosophical 
stance adopted by the individual or decision-maker, which 
should be made clear and explicit. 
The proposition advanced in this study is that insurance for 
communi es located on hazardous coastal sites is both 
desirable and feasible as a management approach. A number 
of points can be made in support of this view. 
rst, is a need to recognize that in the past many 
coastal subdivisions were approved on sites which to the 
best available knowledge at the time appeared suitable. It 
has only been over time that these decisions have been 
proved wrong and subsequent problems have arisen whether 
because of unsuitable initial siting of developments, 
destruction of foreshoie features such as dunes or 
vegetation, or because of poor regulation of activities such 
as sand and gravel mining from beaches. Whatever the cause 
of the hazard there are a significant (and increasing) 
number of existing developments faced with coastal hazards, 
which poses a tical management question. 
A variety of options exist to approach the issue. As noted 
earlier in the study the traditional response has been to 
rely on the 'technological fix' syndrome, namely 
construction of protective works. Recently there has been a 
shift in emphasis towards use of land-use management, 
through planning controls in district schemes, for hazard 
zones defined by a variety of techniques. Another option, 
surprisingly frequently overlooked by decision-makers, is 
that of doing nothing. Le Marquand (1982) makes an 
interesting case for this option where the cost of 
'protection' outweighs the value of the assets at sk. Yet 
another option is that of insurance, or adapting to the loss 
(see Table II). The previous section of this chapter has 
outlined the essential features of insurance, and shown how 
such a scheme has provided a formal means of relief for 
flood plain residents in the United States. It is relevant 
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to note that the United states programme integrates both 
present and future floodplain developments, and also 
integrates the programme with other hazards responses such 
as land-use management, building codes, and engineering 
works. Thus, the programme covers developments through time 
as well as complementing other management approaches. 
A second point 1S that although in New Zealand there 
currently exists legislation limiting future development on 
hazardous s s (sections 641, 641A Local Government Act 
1974), and a number of hazard zone delineation methods 
(Kirk, 1979(a)~ Gibb, 1981(a), 1981(b)), this does not mean 
that such sites, if developed, may not require protection or 
disaster relief at some later date. Insurance may, 
therefore, provide a useful management tool in association 
with other approaches. 
An argument can be made that the availability of insurance 
would encourage people to locate in hazard-prone areas, 
knowing that if they suffer losses they are essentially 
benefitting at the taxpayer's (or insurance pool's) expense. 
However, Kunreuther al. (1978(a)) suggested that 
individuals were likely 
only when they felt the 
to voluntarily purchase insurance 
hazard was a problem. Thus, 
promotion of hazard awareness amongst prospective property 
buyers was viewed as a significant input into the location 
decision. Additionally, promotion of the value of insurance 
and the consequences of the hazard were seen as likely to 
make people more cautious and responsible. In the New 
Zealand context, potential developers and subsequent 
purchasers of property within a hazard zone would become 
aware of the hazard potential when they viewed the relevant 
zoning in the district scheme, or certificate of title to the 
land. 
Providing insurance for new developments also contributes 
towards a comprehensive approach to hazards management since 
it would integrate both existing and future developments, 
and is complementary to other adjustments, as shown on Table 
II, whether they involve engineering works or planning 
responses. 
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The final point forms the basis of the proposition advanced 
here. It is suggested that present management approaches do 
not adequately consider the needs of those communities 
presently faced with a coastal erosion hazard, and given the 
number of such sites and the value of assets at risk this 
poses a significant management issue. 
Drawing lines on maps and signating these as hazard zones 
provides no positive assistance to these people if disaster 
strikes. In effect it seems that this type of management is 
nothing more than a sophisticated do nothing option. The 
question then becomes: Does society close its s to the 
problems faced by these communities and seek to ensure they 
do not re-occur in future developments? At present, the 
answer s to be in the firmative. 
It is possible, however, to present a moral ew that 
society should not walk away from these affected communities 
merely because improved knowledge and experience has shown 
such sites to be inappropriately located. 
There is also a question as to whether the coastal hazard 
should be differentiated from other natural hazards, such as 
earthquakes, floods or landslip, for which insurance is 
available. As noted by the Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry into the Abbotsford Landslip saster (1980:159): 
'Whether claims are paid or nor should not 
depend upon the fine distinction between 
different events of an essentially same 
character and with essenti ly similar 
physical and practical consequences. We do 
not think that it is equitable to distinguish 
between disaster situations which se as a 
result so called "Acts of God" and those 
that are attributable to "Acts of Man".' 
This is significant because it is likely that a coastal 
community at some date will experience a 'coastal 
Abbotsford' (possibly this has already occurred to some 
extent at, for examp Omokoroa promontory near Tauranga 
(see Gibb, 1979:20-21), parts of the Hawkes Bay coastline, 
and Raumati on Wellington's Kapiti coast). The causes of 
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such an event could conceivably be attributable to a 
combination of both an "Act of God" and an "Act of Man" . 
However, the differentiation implied by the two terms 
suggests that the causes of a disaster are mutually 
exclusive. This would seem unlikely to be the case given 
the interdependence of most natural hazards which by 
definition involve an interaction between the natural events 
system and the human use system in such a manner that 
threatens or damages the latter system (see Kates, 1970:1). 
From this two questions can be posed: 
(i) if the present distinction remains, how will they 
be stinguished in a particular hazard situation? 
and 
(ii) what actions will be taken concerning r ief and 
rehabilitation if either event resu s in loss of 
use of land? 
On the basis of these points it seems reasonable to conclude 
that there is little rational basis upon which to draw a 
distinction between the coastal ero on hazard and other 
natural hazards. 
There is an acceptance, then, that although it is important 
to benefit from past mistakes it is equally important to 
attempt to rectify existing problem areas if possible. 
Insurance offers one such method. 
6.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter has introduced the potential role that 
insurance could playas a hazards management approach. It 
was emphasized that it was neither the definitive solution 
nor was it a mutually exclusive approach. Rather it offers 
a contribution towards comprehensive coastal hazard zone 
management by integrating cover for both existing and future 
developments on hazardous sites, as well as providing a 
complement to other hazard responses. 
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A basic decision is necessary first, however, It is 
essential to decide whether what is envisaged is an 
insurance scheme, bas lly sharing the sk, or whether 
what is proposed is a of social insurance, partly or 
fully charged upon the whole community. Many implications 
would follow from this choice. 
It was noted that an insurance scheme for natural hazards 
would be viable if it was: 
(i) compulsory and based on a properly calculated 
premium; or 
(ii) heavily subsidized by the government; and 
(iii) fully underwritten by the government as a virtual 
reinsurer of last resort. 
The proposition was advanced that insurance for loss of use 
of land by coastal erosion is both desirable and feasible as 
a management approach. Three major reasons were rai in 
support this view. 
First, appear to be an increasing number of exis 
communities faced with coastal hazards which threaten both 
private and public assets. These developments were approved 
at a time when the available knowledge of coastal processes 
and land-use management practices were minimal, and it has 
only been over time that such sions were shown to 
inappropriate. 
Second, although there is legislation available to limit 
future development on hazardous sites, and a number of 
methods available to delineate hazard zones, this does not 
mean that such sites if developed may not require protection 
or disaster rel at some later date. The availability of 
insurance for future developments would provide communities 
with positive assistance and assurance should disaster 
strike, without encouraging development on hazard-prone 
sites. 
Finally, it was 
presented that 
suggested 
accepted that 
that a moral view could be 
society should not walk away 
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from the problems faced by existing coastal hazard sites, 
and on the legislation to ensure future developments 
were more appropriately sited. 
This sed a significant question concerning the present 
differentiation between the coa 
which insurance cover is not avai 
hazards for which cover is available. 
did not appear equitable to distinguish 
erosion hazard, for 
and other natural 
It was noted that it 
between situations 
sing as a result of so called "Acts of God" and those 
attributable to "Acts of Man", particularly since there will 
probably be some mix of the two in any hazard event. 
Arising from this proposition, two questions were posed: 
(i) if the present stinction remains, how will they 
be distinguished a particular hazard situation? 
and 
(ii) what actions will be taken concerning reli and 
rehabilitation if either event results in loss of 
use of land? 
The likelihood of a coastal community 
'coastal Abbotsford' at some date would seem 
experiencing a 
to make the 
above points an important consideration, and on this basis 
it was concluded that there was little rational base upon 
which to draw a distinction between the coastal erosion 
hazard and other natural hazards. 
Insurance for s use of land caused by coastal erosion 
was therefore proposed as being both des and feasible 
as a management approach. The following chapter outlines a 
number of approaches that could be cons by decision-
makers if insurance were available. This recognises that 
ultimately a decision on the type(s) hazards adjustments 
adopted is a political decision, and that insurance is 
merely one 
reviewed. 
be aware 
of a number of possible responses that could be 
It also recognises that deci on-makers need to 
of the various alternatives available for 
formulating management approaches if hazards responses are 
to be relevant and appropriate to the situation. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVE MANAGEMENT APPROACHES 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
It has been sugges that there are a number of issues 
posed by current hazards management approaches (Chapter 
Five). Additionally, it has been noted that the recent 
shift in emphasis from an engineering response to a planning 
response for hazard zone management has not alleviated the 
situation faced by residents living in existing hazard 
s Insurance was suggested as one possi approach 
which might contribute towards comprehensive hazards 
management by integrating measures for both existing and 
future development on hazardous sites, as well as by 
providing a complement to other responses such as 
engineering works or land-use management. 
This chapter further develops the idea of insurance as an 
alternative management approach. Specifically, for coastal 
hazard zones it is possible to identify five major parties 
with an interest in and/or duty for management. These 
parties are outlined, before discussing a variety of 
alternatives that could be adopted as hazard adjustments. 
Each alternative is presented and examined but no attempt is 
made to dis nguish which should be adopted. This stance 
acknowledges that final decisions regarding the mix of 
hazard adjustments rest with political decision-makers, who 
should consider insurance as only one of a number of 
possible management approaches. Finally, an examination of 
the implications raised by insurance for hazards policy is 
made. 
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7.2 THE MAJOR PARTICIPANTS INVOLVED IN COASTAL HAZARD 
ZONE MANAGEMENT 
Four major 'actors' can be identified as having an interest 
in and/or statutory duty for coastal hazards management. 
They are: 
(i) the insurance industry; 
(ii) Government agencies with a statutory duty and/or 
interest; 
(iii) local authorities; and 
(iv) affected residents. 
7.2.1 The insurance industry 
Kunreuther (1978(a» noted that the insurance 
industry found it difficult to offer hazards insurance for 
reasons such as adverse selection because of demand for 
Cover being concentrated in relatively few areas, the 
possibility of moral hazard involving dishonest practices of 
the insured, and high transactions costs incurred in 
developing customised premiums. 
These authors also believe that from a company's ewpoint 
the price charged for protection must be determined by the 
risk. If risks are interdependent, which is most likely in 
the case of a natural hazard, then an additional premium 
will be charged to reflect the potentially high loss from a 
major disaster. This extra cost will cover the cost of 
reinsurance (whereby a company spreads its portfolio of 
pol ies to ensure it spreads the risks) or the possible 
risk of bankruptcy. A further source of additional costs 
cited by these authors concerns the degree of uncertainty on 
the probability distribution and losses associated with the 
risk. 
It appears that the reasons listed by Kunreuther et al. 
(1978(a):24S), and noted in the preceding chapter, regarding 
the reluctance of the industry to provide hazards insurance 
app es in New Zealand in relation to cover for loss of use 
of land by coastal erosion. For example, Chung (1983) found 
that the insurance industry does not currently offer any 
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policies for such loss and did not anticipate doing so in 
the immediate future. However, the industry does provide 
cover for flooding and it may be possible to extend their 
policies to include loss of use of land caused by coastal 
erosion. 
7.2.2 Government agencies 
Principally these are the National Water and Soil 
Conservation Authority (NWASCA), the Soil Conservation and 
Rivers Control Council (SCRCC), and the Earthquake and War 
Damage Commission. 
Following a recent amendment to the Soil Conservation and 
Rivers Control Act 1941, the functions and duties of the 
SCRCC have now been placed within the responsibili es of an 
enlarged NWASCA (see Soil and Water 20 2 , 1984:27-36). It 
is therefore possible to deal with both of these 
organisations as a single entity. 
The current NWASCA policy on natural hazards and limitations 
to land use was released in 1981, and s main points were 
outlined in Chapter Four. It would be possible to include 
the promotion of any insurance cover for loss of use of land 
caused by coastal hazards as part of this policy, 
particularly since the policy is largely orientated to 
limiting future development on hazardous sites without a 
similar emphasis on actions that could be taken for managing 
existing hazard sites. 
Extending the NWASCA policy to include promotion of 
insurance cover would also support the view that not only 
should hazards management encompass present and future 
hazard sites, but also that insurance provides a complement 
to both the engineering and planning responses. This is 
significant because the current SCRCC policy for managing 
coastal erosion problems emphasises protective works as a 
favoured response whilst the present NWASCA policy on 
natural hazards places stress on land-use management through 
planning. Now that both pol es come within the overall 
responsibility of NWASCA, it would appear that promoting 
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insurance as an additional policy is timely and provides 
opportunity for a more comprehensive management approach. 
Further, there could be consideration given to integrating 
building code regulations into the hazards policies 
administered by NWASCA as it is important to acknowledge 
that what gets placed on top of land is equally as important 
as what makes up the land and the uses it is put to. 
Recently a review of planning and building controls was 
completed and it was suggested that a Building Industry 
Commission should be established to oversee the 
implementation and administration 
code (Office of the Review of 
of a national building 
Planning and Building 
Controls, The Treasury, 1984). Such a Commission could 
provide useful assistance in the drafting of additional 
sections to the relevant policy statements. 
Cover afforded by the Earthquake and War Damage Commission 
has undergone revision recently and the perils now covered 
are earthquake, volcanic eruption and hydrothermal activity, 
and landslip (Earthquake and War Damage Regulations, 1984). 
As a national, government-guaranteed agency the Commission 
would appear a-natural choice as the organisation that could 
provide cover for loss of use of land caused by coastal 
erosion. This view was proposed by the Commission of 
Inquiry into the Abbotsford Landslip Disaster (1980:160-161, 
171), who recommended that such cover should be available on 
a compulsory basis to all landowners with premiums being 
collected through the local authority rating mechanism based 
on unimproved value of land. The main factor against the 
Commission providing such cover concerns the lack of 
sufficient funds to payout on claims (Hellberg, 1984; Parr, 
1984(b)i Terry, 1984). If this problem were overcome the 
Commission could playa s.ignificant role, similar to that of 
the government-backed National Flood Insurance Programme In 
the United States, with much of the necessary expertise and 
administrative machinery already available. 
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7.2.3 Local authorities 
The manner in which local authorities implement and 
administer controls for hazard zones is critical. It would 
be useful to initiate an educational campaign for affected 
residents to create an awareness of the hazard threat and 
its potential impact, as well as outlining the type(s) of 
management approaches adopted and the reasons for these. If 
insurance was one of the approaches endorsed, attention 
should be drawn to its lability and the relevant 
organisation to contact. Possibly all this information 
could be part of a 'hazard awareness kit' enclosed with the 
annual rate demand notice. 
Additionally use of films and visual displays could be 
cons , particularly for use at public meetings held at, 
say, six month intervals. Presenting information in this 
way may increase memorability and imaginability enough to 
se the subjective probability of the event above a 
son's critical threshold (Kunreuther et al., 1978(a». 
This last point is important since Kunreuther's study 
concluded that 
' ... people refuse to attend to or worry about 
events whose probability is below some 
threshold, the level of which may vary from 
individual to individual and from situation to 
situation' (Kunreuther et al., 1978(a):236). 
The above conclusion becomes signi if insurance were 
part of any management approach adopted since it has been 
suggested that the two most important factors in predicting 
whether a person would purchase insurance were whether the 
hazard was considered to be a serious problem, and whether 
the person knew someone who had purcha 
et al., 1978 (a». 
cover (Kunreuther 
As Saarinen (1982) notes the first of these factors seems to 
be related to hazard experience, and the second highlights 
the importance of the personal 
neighbours in the adoption process. 
luence of friends or 
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For an effective educational programme, however, Saarinen 
(1982) believes random distribution of information on 
hazards to the public is not enough. He contends that the 
educational effort should be part of a broader set of 
strategies whose elements should evolve over time and that 
could include land-use management approaches or incentives 
which reinforce environmentally sound behaviour. He also 
notes that because of the importance of personal influence 
from friends and neighbours and the need for feedback and 
encouragement, community action programmes involving face-
to-face contact in meetings and small groups may be 
necessary for optimal results. 
Sood (1982) takes up this view and suggests that 
communication for improved hazard awareness involves: 
( i ) using mass media to disseminate awareness messages 
and to provide news coverage of hazards; 
(ii) conducting well-designed, on-going public 
information campaigns; and 
(iii) involving members of vulnerable communities in the 
awareness effort. 
A final point to be made is that the effectiveness of any 
public education campaign depends on the manner in which it 
is conducted (Saarinen, 1982). Thoughtful selection of the 
target audience is a basic first step, according to Saarinen 
(1982), since the strategies could differ for hazard zone 
occupants, the general public, and media representatives. 
Rather than broad generalities about the hazard, the focus 
should be on specific actions the audience can take, clearly 
presented in terms of local examples (Saarinen, 1982), and 
highlighting actions taken by the local authority and 
government organisations to provide management. 
7.2.4 Affected coastal residents 
It is particularly important that information concerning the 
nature and possible impacts of the hazard are available to 
coastal residents. Also it is essential than an educational 
programme, as outlined above, be conducted to create an 
awareness of the hazard and the management approach(es) 
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adopted so that residents become familiar with the reasons 
why particular actions have been taken, especially in 
relation to planning controls and protective works. 
Information concerning the availability of insurance could 
be disseminated by a number of organisations depending on 
the management approach taken. For example, the insurance 
industry could send out pamphlets advising that cover is 
available when they send out their premium notices. 
Alternatively, local authorities could inform residents by 
enclosing suitable pamphlets with the yearly or quarterly 
rate demand notice. 
The influence of friends and neighbours has been cited as 
important regarding the dissemination of information, 
particularly for insurance availability and terms of a 
policy (Kunreuther et al., 1978(a):243). Thus, they are 
likely to playa vital role in influencing the decision 
process because they are viewed as accessible and reliable 
sources of information (Kunreuther et al., 1978(a)). It 
would be useful, then, to combine this informal type of 
information network with that of a formal type whether 
conducted by a local authority, government, or the insurance 
industry or even a combination of these. 
7.3 ALTERNATIVE HAZARDS MANAGEMENT APPROACHES 
From reviewing the major 'actors' involved in coastal hazard 
zone management it is possible to suggest a number of 
alternative management approaches based on insurance. As in 
the preceding chapter it is stressed that insurance is not 
viewed as the absolute solution nor is it a mutually 
exclusive approach. It offers opportunities, however, to 
provide management for existing and future hazardous sites 
as well as being complementary to other hazards responses 
whether they are structural or planning types. In this way 
insurance would provide a contribution towards a more 
comprehensive management "approach. 
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There are four combinations that are examined as possible 
management alternatives. They are: 
( i ) cover offered by a government-private individual 
approach; 
(ii) cover offered by a government-insurance industry 
approach; 
(iii) cover offered by a government-local authority 
approach; and 
(iv) cover of by an insurance industry-private 
individual approach. 
7.3.1 Government-private individual 
This would involve extending cover of the Earthquake and 
War Damage Commission to include loss of use of land caused 
by coastal erosion. In this approach the premiums for fire 
insurance, collected by the insurance industry, would 
probably need to increase. 
proportion of this money'would 
companies to the Disaster and 
the Commission. 
As presently occurs, a 
paid by the insurance 
ip Fund administered by 
There are several advantages associ with this approach. 
rst, it is government guaranteed so that any shortfalls in 
funds for claims could be met out of the Consolidated Fund 
(although it is likely the government would charge interest 
on its 'loan' to the Commission). 
Second, the insurance industry merely acts as a go-between 
between individuals and the Commission without bearing 
responsibility for claims, or having to administer the 
programme. Additionally the industry does not bear the 
costs of finding other insurance companies willing to accept 
a share the risk; that is, the industry does not have to 
reinsure the risk. 
Thirdly, the insurance industry does not have to concern 
itself with the problem of adverse selection because even if 
demand for the cover is concentrated in relatively few areas 
it is the Earthquake and War Damage Commission, not the 
industry, who will seek to reinsure the ri Thus, the 
108 
industry is protected against the prob 
funds to meet a catastrophic loss. 
of insufficient 
A number of disadvantages can also be sed however. 
Principally these centre around ability to find and 
afford other insurers willing to act as reinsurers, and the 
need to draw on the Conso Fund should claims exceed 
the funds held by the Commission. This is a real 
possibility, as noted by Terry (1984). He stated that the 
Commission cannot afford any reinsurance cover after an 
extensive survey of the world market, and without this cover 
claims resulting from a major disaster [or series of 
disasters] which exceeded Commission's $900 million fund 
must be met from the Consolidated Fund (see also, Anon, 
1984(b):25). 
The Earthquake and War Damage Act 1944 obliges the 
government to loan Commission any additional money 
required to meet claims not covered by its fund (Terry, 
1984). However, as Terry (1984) states, this means that 
ultimately the burden of funding reconstruction rests 
largely with the taxpayer. 
A further disadvantage was also raised by Terry's article: 
alternatives to reinsurance such as a greatly increased 
Commission levy are unpopular and would not get government 
approval. (At the Commission takes 5 cents per $100 
of all money connected for fire insurance premiums.) 
Parr (1984(b)) pointed out another 
approach. The compulsory nature of the 
problem with this 
programme and the 
uniform premium rate poses an equity issue. All 
society are treated as of equal risk. He notes that critics 
argue that low sk areas are subsidizing areas of high sk 
because this but acknowledges that field assessments of 
risk is a challenging task. 
A final 
involving 
disadvantage, which holds 
the Commission, concerns 
for all approaches 
the liability of the 
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Commission. 
the lesser of: 
According to Parr (1984(b)) its liability is 
(i) the sum insured; or 
(ii) the indemnity value at the time of loss. 
He notes that most liability payments are on the basis of 
the assessed indemnity value at the time of loss but the 
Earthquake and War Damage Act does not define indemnity 
value and a legal def tion of the concept is difficult to 
find. Thus, he believes, coverage on the basis of indemnity 
value will not even come close to meeting the actual costs 
of restoration. Hellberg (1984) supports this view when he 
suggests that an accurate study of a maximum possible loss 
to the Commission must include influences such as inflation 
following the loss. He believes it is questionable whether 
claims will be settled in cash, based on an estimate of the 
cost of repairs, or whether claimants will prefer to wait 
until the actual cost damage is known before agreeing to 
settlement .. A further influence is the extent of any under-
insurance (this was a major problem associated with the 1984 
Invercargill floods; see Lind, 1984:20; Anon, 1984(a):25). 
7.3.2 Government-insurance industry 
In this approach the insurance industry would market cover 
for loss of use of land caused by coastal erosion but there 
would also be a measure of government involvement. 
The government would subsidize premiums to make cover 
affordable and also to eliminate the high transactions costs 
that would be required if customised premiums had to be 
established for existing properties. Premiums on new 
developments would be set to lect the degree of risk, 
which could be reduced by having the developments sited at a 
respectable distance back from the foredune. Use of the 
provisions contained sections 641 or 64lA, and 684 of the 
Local Government Act 1974 could assist in ensuring that both 
new and reconstructed assets were not located in immediate-
risk areas. 
A government reinsurance programme would protect any 
participating insurance firms against catastrophic losses 
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caused by the problem of adverse selection (Kunreuther et 
al., 1978(a)). 
Land-use management, protective works, and building codes 
also have a ro to play, especially since they assist in 
reducing the externalities associated 
developments and in this way offset some of 
with beach 
the potential 
losses. Thus, it could be a co-requisite of any insurance 
cover that, as appropriate, the community has a hazard zone 
signated with appropriate land-use management controls 
enforced, or engineering works constructed to protect 
assets; a combination of these two may also be appropriate 
in certain circumstances. 
It would be important to encourage participation in this 
approach on a community basis rather than on an individual 
basis because without community oversight of developments, 
the efforts of some to reduce losses could be undermined by 
the careless building of others. However, before this the 
community must make a basic decision: Would the adoption of 
insurance and associated management measures benefit 
residents without imposing overly severe constraints on 
property rights? This question recognizes that community 
participation in this approach is a voluntary decision made 
by those most affected. Those communities that choose not 
to participate could forf the government-subsidized 
insurance and be reliant on emergency assistance and 
taxpayer generosity if disaster struck. For those 
communi es choosing to participate, buying insurance would 
be compulsory as would adherence to any other management 
responses. 
Much of the above has been adapted from the American flood 
insurance programme experience (see Kunreuther al., 
1978(a):246-247; Anon, 1984(c):4) and is acknowledged 
that there is further work needed to assess its 
applicability not only to flood, but also to coastal hazards 
in the New Zealand context. It does provide, however, a 
useful starting point from which adaptations can be 
proposed. 
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There are considerable benefits associated with this 
approach. First, because the cover is offered by the 
insurance industry they will be able to use their marketing 
expertise to ensure the public is aware of its availability 
and perhaps emphasize the relatively low cost achieved by 
resort to government subsidization. 
Second, government reinsurance would provide a back-up to 
the industry and eliminate the urgency to find other firms 
willing to take a share of the risk. Although it might be 
argued that this would mean the taxpayer ultimately pays out 
for any shortfall in a firm's fund, this is probably 
unlikely since firms will collect the premiums, retain some 
commission, and use the rest to invest or to add to the 
overall funds received from other policies. In this way the 
firm could build up adequate reserves to meet most claims. 
A third advantage is that other hazards responses such as 
planning controls or engineering works are viewed as 
complements to insurance cover. By making the adoption of 
either or both of these other responses co-requisites to 
obtaining insurance it becomes possible to initiate multiple 
adjustments to a hazard and also provide management relevant 
to present and future developments. 
Finally, community participation is strongly promoted. This 
allows for a unified approach towards management, giving it 
both purpose and direction. Additionally it recognizes that 
coastal hazards rarely affect isolated individuals - they 
are a beach-wide threat requiring beach-wide co-operation in 
management. 
Perhaps the greatest barrier to this approach, however, is 
the assumption that a government will consent to subsidizing 
premiums and also act as a reinsurer. Financial and 
political realities may preclude this. Before any decision 
is made, though, the government would have to consider the 
benefits of providing both these services, particularly 
since under the present situation there is considerable 
local and national pressure to provide relief and emergency 
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assistance after disasters have struck. It might be more 
cost-effective for the government to provide subsidized 
premiums and reinsurance than to totally meet by itself the 
financial and material demands currently made after a 
disaster. 
Another potential problem concerns' the voluntary nature of 
the approach. If the community has decided not to 
participate there is little that can be done to try and 
reverse that decision even if it is patently clear to local 
authori es or government organisations that a particular 
community is threatened by a major hazard. Democracy 
stresses that peop have the right to freely choose. The 
problem becomes, then, whether that choice should be biased 
so that people will select a particular option. Possibly 
there is a need to fairly emphasize the benefits of 
participating as well as the costs of non-participation, 
through a media campaign~ and then leave people to decide as 
they will. 
There appear to be few other disadvantages with this 
approach and it me ts further study and consideration by 
decision~makers. 
7.3.3 Government-local authority 
Essentially this approach follows that set out in the Report 
of the Commission of Inquiry into the Abbotsford Landslip 
Disaster (1980:160-163) where they discussed insurance for 
loss of use land. 
The cover afforded by the Earthquake and War Damage Act 
Commission would be extended to include loss of use of land 
caused by coastal erosion, claims arising when a landowner 
has been e ectively and permanently deprived of the use of 
his land. Use, according to the Commission's Report, means 
use for a purpose. 
The Report also noted that: 
(i) the maximum level of payment should be the 
unimproved value of the land of which use is lost, 
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calculated at its value on the day before the date 
of loss; and 
(ii) payment should be made only in respect of loss, 
which means effective and permanent deprivation of 
use. Damage, therefore, is not compensable 
(Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Abbotsford Landslip Disaster, 1980:161). 
Premiums would be collected by local authorities as part of 
the annual rate demand, and passed on to the Earthquake and 
War Damage Commission. This would be based on the 
unimproved value of the owners I land, and the Report 
suggested that an annual premium of 2 cents for each $100 of 
unimproved value should be charged. It was also suggested 
that the premium should be reviewed after three years in the 
light of claims made to the Commission. 
Although co~er for losi of use of land could arguably be a 
voluntary scheme, a compulsory scheme is 
useful (Report of the Commission of 
Abbotsford Landslip Disaster, 1980:179). 
seen as being more 
Inquiry into the 
This acknowledges 
that loss of use caused by coastal erosion is only one of a 
number of 
residents 
residents 
activity. 
perils 
might 
might 
to 
not 
not 
be covered, so that whilst inland 
experience coastal erosion, coastal 
be threatened by say~ hydrothermal 
The main advantage of this approach is that the necessary 
expertise and administrative machinery is already available, 
so that establishment costs would be substantially reduced. 
Further, the premium to be charged is relatively low and is 
likely to be acceptable to both the public and government, 
whilst providing much needed funds to the Commis on to 
cover ita added responsibility. 
Another benefit is that it would bring coastal hazards into 
line with other natural hazards covered by insurance, 
, 
whether by the Earthquake and War Damage Commission or the 
insurance industry. To date there has been a differentiation 
between hazards such as storms and floods, volcanic 
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eruptions, landsli~ (all covered by insurance) and coastal 
erosion (not covered); this is a significant omission, 
particularly for existing communities threatened by a 
coastal erosion hazard since they are unable to obtain 
insurance cover and must rely on the goodwill of the 
taxpayer in the form of relief and disaster funds. Thus, 
the formal incorporation of coastal hazards into an 
insurance scheme would provide positive assurance and 
assistance for these communities if disaster strikes. 
The compulsory nature of the cover could be cited as a 
disadvantage. As noted earlier Parr (1984(b)) has pointed 
out that critics believe a compulsory scheme forces people 
in low risk areas to subsidize those living in high risk 
areas. This can be countered by pointing out that natural 
hazards do not discriminate according to any boundaries, 
social, pol ical or geographical. Low risk, infrequent 
events may be of.a catastrophic nature when they do occur 
and may wreak more damage, physically and pyschologically, 
because people's awareness of the hazard has been dulled 
over time. In contrast, people living in high risk areas 
are likely to be more aware of the hazard and its 
implications and be receptive to mitigative measures. 
There is also evidence that despite the availability of 
subsidized insurance, few individuals have been interested 
in purchasing cover on a voluntary basis (Kunreuther ., 
1978(a) :246-247). In the United States this was a major 
reason for the introduction of the Flood Disaster Protection 
Act of 1973 which increased the incentives for flood-prone 
communities to participate in the flood insurance programme 
and for residents of those areas to purchase cover 
(Kunreuther , 1978(a):247). 
As with the previous approach, then, it is suggested that 
further development of this option, and examination of its 
implications is merited. 
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7.3.4 Insurance industry-private individual 
This would follow the procedure currently used by the 
industry to market cover for storm and flood damage. 
Companies would send out notices with annual premium demands 
for ordinary household and contents cover to inform people 
that insurance was available for loss of use of land, 
including loss caused by coastal erosion. It would then be 
up to individuals to decide whether they should follow this 
up and purchase cover. It would be expected that an active 
promotional and marketing campaign would be part of this 
approach. 
From the companies' viewpoint the premium must be determined 
by the sk. As Kunreuther ala (1978(a» note the actual 
rate will normally be higher than the pure loss premium for 
several reasons. First, there are costs associated with 
establishing the rate to be charged, and servicing the 
policies (transaction co~ts). Second, if risks are inter-
dependent as is probable in the case of a natural hazard, an 
additional premium will be charged to reflect the 
potentially high loss from a major disaster. This extra 
charge will cover the cost of reinsurance or the possible 
risk of bankruptcy. A further source of additional costs 
noted by these authors concerns the degree of certainty that 
loss will occur and the costs of settling claims 
subsequently made (a form of adverse selection). 
All of these costs may result in the premiums being too high 
for people to afford, and uptake of cover being minimal. In 
this event companies may find it more profitab to withdraw 
such cover and either offer insurance for other matters or 
choose to invest their funds. 
Other potential problems identified by Kunreuther's study 
(1978(a» concern moral hazard ,and externalities. Moral 
hazard refers to the d ficulty companies could have in 
distinguishing between avoidable and unavoidable risks in 
, 
drawing up their insurance contracts. For example, a person 
with cover may deliberately move old appliances to areas 
where they will be damaged and then claim for this. To 
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minimize this problem insurance companies would need to 
specify a certain excess (whereby the insured pays the first 
amount of any claim) for policies. 
Externalities refers to the actions of others that affect 
people who had no part in initiating that action. Thus, 
groynes on one part of a beach could impose externalities on 
others along the beach by restricting longshore movement of 
material and causing erosion problems. Determining the 
effect of externalities for the purpose of setting premiums 
would be difficult to quantify and pose administrative 
problems because the e of the externality could vary 
from one location to the next along the beach, and possibly 
over time. 
Further, it is likely that companies would not offer cover 
for loss of use of land unless it were part of an industry-
wide approadh. This is ~sserted because no one company or 
number of companies could afford to bear all the costs of 
administering such a policy or afford to settle claims if 
disaster struck. Reinsurance, for example, would be 
dif cult to obtain since other companies would be reluctant 
to accept part of the risk. It is clear, then, that if such 
insurance were available it would have to be on an industry-
wide ba s. 
The recent trans of storm and flood cover from the 
Earthquake and War Damage Commission to the insurance 
industry presents an excellent opportunity to observe the 
viability of natural hazards cover by the private sector. 
It will be both interesting and relevant to study whether 
the public will actively support such a move through their 
purchase of policies, and the manner in which the industry 
administers the programme as well as the amounts it pays out 
for claims. Such observations would assist in framing up 
approaches for insurance for loss of use of land. 
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7.4 THE IMPLICATIONS OF INSURANCE FOR COASTAL HAZARDS 
POLICY 
Although a number of alternative management approaches based 
on insurance have been outlined, it is possible to 
generalize the implications of such alternatives for coastal 
hazards policy. 
As has been stressed previously insurance is not seen as the 
absolute solution for hazards management. It does offer, 
however, opportunity to manage both existing and future 
developments on hazardous sites by providing a formal means 
of sharing the loss should disaster strike. For existing 
communities threatened by coastal hazards this is signif-
icant since at present they are not able to obtain such 
cover and must rely on civil defence and taxpayer generosity 
if disaster strikes. No doubt these would continue to apply 
if insurance were available, but the distinct difference is 
that insurance would assist in the long-term recovery of 
communities and its residents once the peak of the disaster 
has passed. 
The availabi ty of insurance is not seen as encouraging 
future development on inappropriate sites. Use of sections 
641, 64lA and 684 of the Local Government Act 1974, and 
relevant sections of the Town and Country Planning Act 
1977, concerning the siting developments support this 
view. Further the increasing acceptance and use of hazard 
zone identification methods and associated controls in 
planning schemes give additional weight to this belief. A 
national building code, if adopted, would also assist in 
ensuring future developments were prudently sited. It also 
acknowledges the need to consider the related factors of 
(i) land structure, geology and processes affecting 
these; 
(ii) the siting of developments; and 
(iii) the type of structure permitted and the standards 
it must meet. 
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Use of singular hazards responses, whether of an engineering 
or planning type, have not provided satisfactory results in 
many instances. Although this does not mean such responses 
by themselves are not appropriate in some cases, it would be 
useful to consider alternatives that complement these 
approaches. Insurance is one such alternative. In this 
manner it becomes possible to promote multip adjustments 
to a hazard and offers a more co-ordinated approach that 
integrates short- and long-term management. 
The po cies of NWASCA and the SCRCC for natural hazards 
could be expanded to include above view. For example, 
the existing policy on natural hazards and limitations to 
land-use (NWASCO, 1982) could include an additional 
statement to the effect that investigation and promotion of 
alternative hazards responses by local and central 
government agencies should be made be a finalised 
management approach is' adopted. Such alternatives may 
involve a combination of responses if appropriate. 
Depending upon which of the insurance approaches previously 
outlined was adopted, the insertion of an additional policy 
statement may be a compulsory matter. Adoption of a 
government-insurance industry approach or government-local 
authority approach, for instance, could make the insertion 
and implementation of such a statement a condition of 
government consent to endorse the approach. 
Whatever approach(es) may be finally adopted it is stressed 
that insurance offers an excellent opportunity for decision-
makers to consider a wider range of possible hazards 
responses and for a more comprehensive method of management. 
7.5 SUMMARY 
The major participants involved in coastal hazard zone 
management were identified; these were: 
(i) the insurance industry; 
(ii) Government agencies with a statutory duty and/or 
interest; 
(iii) local authorities; and 
(iv) affected residents. 
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For each participant the manner in which they were involved 
was outlined as well as ways in which they could contribute 
towards improved management approaches. 
This led on to a discussion of four different management 
alternatives based on combinations of the above 
participants, using insurance as the key factor. These 
alternatives were: 
( i ) cover offered by a government-private individual; 
(ii) cover offered by a government-insurance industry; 
(iii) cover offered by a government-local authoritYi and 
(iv) cover offered by the insurance industry-private 
individual. 
The implications of insurance for coastal hazards policy 
were then examined. It was emphasized that insurance was 
not the definitive management solution but it does offer 
opportunity to manage both existing and future developments 
on hazardous sites as well as being complementary to other 
responses that may be considered. In this way it increases 
the choices open to decision-makers when 
appropriate strategies to adopt and provides a 
approach to short- and long-term coastal 
management. 
considering 
co-ordinated 
hazard zone 
To end, the final chapter reviews the findings of the study 
and presents conclusions. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this study was to examine the issues, 
conflicts and implications posed by the current management 
approach~s for existing and potential hazard sites, and to 
develop alternative approaches which would assist in 
resolving the identified prob 
The study has achieved s objective by firstly outlining 
and discussing the key issues raised by the present 
management responses for coastal communities threatened by 
an erosion hazard. From this I examination of the 
major issues a number of alternative management approaches, 
based on insurance, were developed. The alternatives 
proposed would be relevant to both existing and future 
coastal hazard sites as well as being complementary to other 
hazards responses adopted. In this manner the study has 
provided a useful contribution towards the resolution of the 
matters raised, and has pointed to the potential benefits of 
a more integrated approach to coastal hazards management. 
Two major reasons were identified why this study would be 
relevant and timely. First, it was suggested that current 
coastal hazard zone management approaches do not provide 
posi 
Cons 
pre 
valuab 
assistance or assurance to residents living within 
hazard areas should a severe event strike. 
the number of sites around the New Zealand coast 
faced with a coastal erosion hazard, threatening 
public and private assets, this poses a signi cant 
management issue. 
The second major reason concerned the proposition that 
although promotion of hazard area delineation techniques and 
relevant legislation are eminently useful in 1 futUre 
development on hazardous sites, their use s particular 
problems. Principally these include the implementation, 
administration and associated implications for local 
authorities and affected residents. 
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In utilising both the del,ineation techniques and the 
provisions of the relevant legislation, there has been a 
shift in emphasis from iance on a 'technological fix' 
approach to one of land-use management using planning 
controls. However, many of the problems posed by the 
technological approach, such as cost effectiveness and 
unanticipated side effects, have re-emerged with the current 
commitment to a planning response. This was clearly 
illustrated by the findings of the case-study on Wainui 
Beach, Gisborne. 
As a contribution towards resolving some of theconfl and 
issues raised by present management approaches it was 
suggested that it would useful to broaden the range of 
alternatives available for decision-makers to consider. 
Insurance was proposed as one such alternative. 
Insurance for loss of u~e of land caused by coastal erosion 
was suggested as a management approach that could encompass 
both existing and future hazard sites as well as providing a 
complement to other hazards responses, whether they are of a 
technological or planning nature. In this manner it would 
become possible to propose hazard adjustments applicable 
through time and also across a range of approaches. The 
adoption of such a suggestion would also bring the coastal 
erosion hazard into line with other hazards presently 
covered by insurance, offering the opportunity of providing 
a more comprehensive approach to natural hazards management. 
This study has also raised some general points concerning 
the relation between the theoretical aspects of natural 
hazards research and the types of coastal hazards responses 
adopted in New Zealand. 
It has been noted that response to natural hazards is 
influenced by two major factors. The first is perception of 
the hazard. For both communities and individuals threatened 
by a hazard perception of the impacts of a severe event may 
vary according to many factors, such as hazard frequency, 
personal experience of a hazard event, or threat to personal 
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assets. The second major influence governing hazards 
response concerns the awareness of opportunities to make 
adjustments. Thus, if decision-makers are aware of a wider 
range of possible adjustments, it is likely they will 
formulate management approaches that are more appropriate to 
the situation. This could involve the use of a combination 
of hazards adjustments at the same time if it is 
desirable. 
In New Zealand there has been a recent shift in empha s 
from reliance on a purely technical type of hazards response 
to one of relying on land-use management, and particularly 
planning controls. whi t use of singular management 
approaches are appropriate in certain circumstances, this 
study has pointed to many of the problems associated with 
this type of management approach. Of special significance 
is the suggestion that the limited investigation and 
Oonsideration of alternative hazards responses has meant 
that decision-makers are reviewing a restricted range of 
adjustments ba on either an engineering or planning 
approach. Thus, management responses are being constrained 
since decision-makers are not considering a wi range of 
possible hazards adjustments that could be implemented. 
This is a particularly important point since it appears that 
the current hazards approaches tend to be more suited 
towards ensuring future development on hazardous sites does 
not occur. For sting coastal communities threatened by 
an erosion hazard, however, the approaches do not seem to 
offer any posit assistance or assurance should a severe 
event strike. 
The relevant hazards legislation enacted in New Zealand and 
the policies of administering agencies also emphasize 
restricting future development on inappropriate sites. When 
viewed together, however, the legis ion appears to provide 
statutory opportunity for agencies to consider implementing 
multiple hazard adjustments, based on a combination of 
technical and planning responses. Such adjustments could be 
used for managing both existing and future hazard sites. 
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Thus, the legislation provides decision-makers with the 
statutory discretion to review the majority of adjustments 
suggested by the hazards theory. These adjustments include 
those that modify loss potential (by for instance, planning 
controls), those that modify the hazard (through say, 
protective works), and those that affect the cause of the 
hazard (by influencing activities or location in the hazard 
area). The only adjustment that decision-makers have not 
seemed to consider is that of adapting to the loss, through 
insurance or relief and rehabilitation measures. 
Adapting to losses is an important omission because it is 
the only adjustment that deals explicitly with the 
implications of the post hazard-event phase. All the other 
adjustments seek to reduce people's vulnerability to the 
hazard event, whether in response to previous damage or to 
reduce the impacts of future potential damage, without 
suggesting measures that could assist in the long-term 
reconstruction of community and individual well-being. In 
view of the number of existing and potential hazard sites on 
the New Zealand coast, and the value of assets at risk, 
would be timely to incorporate this type of adjustment along 
with those already considered by decision-makers. 
Thus, it appears that one deficiency of the present coastal 
hazards management approach in New Zealand is the limited 
range of adjustments being implemented. As noted above this 
is disturbing considering the number of sites that are 
presently, or may in future be, threatened by an erosion 
hazard. 
A further deficiency concerns the types of policies adopted 
by the hazards management agencies. These policies tend to 
stress mutually exclusive approaches despite the apparent 
opportunity provided by the relevant statutes to utilise a 
combination of adjustments. A better appreciation of this 
opportunity, reflected in an agencies' policy statements, 
would give decision-makers explicit discretion to consider a 
wider range of management responses. 
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To address these deficiencies further work could usefully be 
done on a number of topics. 
It appears that there is a large gap between the findings 
generated by natural hazards researchers and translating 
these findings into effective public policy (Olson and 
Nilson, 1982). Study of ways in which this gap could be 
narrowed would be particularly relevant given the increasing 
number of disciplines involved in natural hazards research, 
and the degree to which private versus public interest need 
to be reconciled when formulating hazards policy. 
This raises another topic that could be usefully researched 
the relevancy and significance of national pol es on 
natural hazards at the local level. This suggestion 
recognizes that in some instances a general policy may not 
provide much useful guidance to those agencies charged with 
the day-to-day planning "and management for hazard areas, so 
that although the policy statements purport to provide a set 
of guidelines for local authorities to use the very broad 
objectives contained in such statements might not be of much 
assistance at the local councilor catchment board decision-
making level. 
A further topic, associated with the above suggestion, 
concerns the desirability of promoting a wider consideration 
of management approaches as part of any po cy on natural 
hazards. It would be useful to provide sion-makers with 
flexibility when choosing among management approaches, and 
this would depend on technical staff being encouraged to 
investigate a wider range of approaches than is currently 
provided for in the NWASCA hazards policy. The development 
of other hazards adjustments additional to engineering 
works, planning controls, and insurance is 
particularly in view of the suggestion that 
natural hazards is influenced to a large 
awareness of alternative strategies. 
The present study developed four alternative 
approaches based on insurance. It would be 
advocated, 
response to 
degree by an 
management 
relevant to 
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study further the economic implications of establishing each 
alternative, as well as the manner in which each could be 
translated into public policy. There are not only costs and 
benefits associated with each option, but also there are a 
number of different policy types available to administer the 
options. Nilson and Olson (1982), for example, have 
identified four different policy types, each with different 
implications. 
Finally, this study has identi ed issues, conflicts, and 
associated implications of the present hazards management 
approaches and developed a number of options that address 
those matters. On the basis of the points raised, 
consideration and debate of the alternatives presented would 
seem appropriate in view of the opportunity insurance could 
provide as a contribution towards comprehensive coastal 
hazard zone management. 
So then, beach, bluff, and wave, farewell! 
I bear with me 
No token stone nor glittering shell, 
But long and oft shall Memory tell 
Of this brief thoughtful hour of musing by the Sea. 
John Greenleaf Whittier: "Hampton Beach" 
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